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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Manned Maneuvering Unit FMEA/CIL
I. 0 EXECUTXVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for preparation of FMEA and CIL. l0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis (Reference 6) of the
Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU) hardware, generating draft failure
modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence,
this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contain within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results
were then compared to the proposed Martin Marietta FMEA/CIL Post
51-L updates (Reference 7). A discussion of each discrepancy
from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as
required. However, due to the cancellation of the Martin
Marietta FMEA/CIL task, and subsequent cancellation of the IOA
FMEA/CIL task, the resolution of these discrepancies were not
attempted. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and
recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the
time. This report documents the results of this comparison for
the Orbiter MMU hardware.
The IOA product for the MMU analysis consisted of 204 failure
mode "worksheets" that resulted in 95 potential critical items
being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline (as
of January 5, 1987) which consisted of 179 FMEAs and ii0 CIL
items. The comparison determined if there were any results which
had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline.
This comparison produced agreement on all but 121 FMEAs which
caused differences in 92 CIL items. Figure 1 presents a
comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA
recommended baseline, and any issues.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
FMEA/CIL preparation instructions.
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Figure 1 - MMU FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) FMEA/CIL
for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 MMU Ground Rules and Assumptions
Due to the unique functions performed by the MMU, the IOA project
determined it necessary to establish groundrules and assumptions
applicable solely to the MMU (reference Appendix B). These
ground rules and assumptions, in addition to those established
project wide (also provided in Appendix B), are intended to both
complement and supplement those defined in NSTS 22206.
Additionally, they ensure that the IOA MMU analysis is capable of
being understood by personnel who did not directly participate in
the analysis.
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3.0 SYSTEMDESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The MMU, reference Figure 2, is a modular, self-contained,
propulsive backpack designed to attach to the Extravehicular
Mobility Unit (EMU) and to be donned and doffed by one unassisted
crewmember. When used, the MMU increases the Orbiter crew's
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) mobility by extending the range of
their activities from the payload bay to other portions of the
spacecraft, to appendages of payloads protruding from the cargo
bay, or to other spacecraft entirely. When not in use, the MMU
is stowed in the forward payload bay on the Flight Support
Station (FSS), reference Figure 3. Two MMUs are typically flown
on each Orbiter mission.
The IOA analysis has defined the MMU as being comprised of a
propulsion subsystem, electrical/power subsystem, support
structures and mechanisms, and the FSS. These subsystems and
hardware can operate singly or in an integrated manner to perform
four primary functions: propulsion, control, system maintenance
and stowage, and crewmember restraint/fit.
i. P_opulsion Subsystem - Two independent, identical subsystems
are each capable of providing the translational and
rotational forces necessary for propulsion. Inert GN2
propellant is stored in two pressure vessels. Activation of
a motor-driven isolation val_e (open) allows GN2 to flow to
a pressure regulator and then to the thruster manifolds
which consist of four 3-thruster (triad) assemblies for each
of the two subsystems. Based on hand-controller and gyro
inputs, electrical power to the thruster solenoid valves
result in expansion of the nitrogen gas through a nozzle to
produce propulsion. The two systems are isolated but can be
interconnected through hand-actuated toggle valves. Quick-
disconnect valves provide GN2 recharge capability for the
pressure vessels when the MMU is stowed in the FSS. Figure
4 is a schematic of the propulsion subsystem.
. Electrical/Power Subsystem - Encompasses the control
electronics and the power storage and distribution within
the MMU. Figure 5 presents an overview of this subsystem.
The maneuvering control comprises three main elements - two
hand controllers and the Control Electronics Assembly (CEA).
These operate together to provide signals to the propulsion
system for rotational or translational motion. The
Rotational Hand Controller (RHC) furnishes switching logic
that converts rotary motions of the handle to rotational
commands. The RHC also supplies control for the attitude
hold function. The Translational Hand Controller (THC)
provides switching logic that converts the motions of the
handle in three axes to translational commands. The THC
also controls the propellant isolation valve.
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Figure 2 - MANNED MANEUVERING UNIT (MMU)
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Figure 5 - ELECTRICAL/POWER SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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•The CEA contains circuitry to operate the thruster valves of
the propulsion system, and circuitry to respond to hand-
controller commands for translational and rotational
control. Gyro circuitry provides attitude and rate
information. Phase-plane circuitry furnishes inputs for the
thruster select logic for the automatic attitude hold mode
of operation.
The thruster select logic uses either or both redundant
thruster sets to convert manual and/or attitude hold
commands to thrust commands. Valve drive amplifiers amplify
the thruster valve signals to levels required for valve
operation. Isolation valves, when open, allow GN 2 to flow
from the pressure vessels to the pressure regulators.
Thruster cue lights allow a visible indication of thruster
commands and isolation valve operation.
The power comprises two silver-zinc batteries and two
separate power distribution systems that include the circuit
breakers, switches, and relays required for MMU operation.
Power conditioners in the CEA, fed from the batteries,
supply power to the CEA and hand controllers. Locator
lights provide visible indication of the location of the EVA
crewmember to an observing crewmember inside the Orbiter.
The locator lights consist of a converter assembly and three
light assemblies. The batteries also furnish heater power
for the propulsion heaters and hand controller case heaters.
Heaters are required for both orbital storage and EVA
operations• During EVA, skin temperatures can be as low as
-120 degrees F, whereas most components must be above -60
degrees F for operation.
SUDDort Structures and Mechanisms - The basic MMU structure
consists of two side towers connected by the center struc-
ture and two arms. The towers support the thrusters and
provide mounting for the MMU/FSS retention latches and the
propulsion subsystem Quick Disconnects (QDs). The center
structure supports the two batteries, eight circuit
breakers, the CEA, two pressure vessels, and propulsion
equipment. Also supported are the external power connector,
and thermal cover, and the thermal covers for the batteries.
In conjunction with the towers, the center structure
supports the retention system for the EMU. This EMU/MMU
retention system consists of two independent manually
activated latches, guide ramps, and back-support points.
The arms can be pivoted and extended for flight or located
in the stowed position.
i0
•
Fliaht SUDDOrt Station /FSSI - The FSS, reference Figure 3,
provides MMU stowage, GN2 pressure vessel recharge, and
stowage heaters for the MMU on the port or starboard side of
the Orbiter near the EVA airlock and hatch.
The FSS structure comprises the side arms, foot restraints,
and the Orbiter mounting structure. A locking handle and
butterfly latch are provided for flight docking, capture,
and release of the MMU. The foot restraints are adjustable
on orbit to accommodate the full range of astronaut
anthropometry. Shock mounts (vibration isolators) are
provided to attenuate the Orbiter launch environment. The
MMU is secured in the FSS during launch with four capture
bolts and Gas Actuated Nuts (GANs) installed in the MMU. On
astronaut operation, the nuts will actuate and MMU bolts
release, allowing FSS egress. For contingency operations,
the nuts can be manually engaged or disengaged•
The pneumatic portion of the FSS consists of a dual Orbiter
interface which routes GN2 to redundant charging systems,
either one of which can recharge the MMU propulsion system•
Each charging system contains a charging valve, vent valve,
flex hose, and one-half of the QD. GN2 can also be supplied
to the GANs used for MMU-to-FSS launch attachment.
FSS heaters are supplied 28-Vdc power from the Orbiter
through two independent power buses. Breakers in the
Orbiter cabin furnish circuit protection. Five temperature
sensors are provided for crew temperature monitoring of the
MMU during orbital storage.
II
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
Interfaces occur between the MMU (including the FSS) and other
Space Transportation System (STS) Orbiter elements in three
specific areas. First, the MMU itself interfaces with the FSS.
Second, structural, mechanical, electrical, and nitrogen recharge
interfaces exist between the Orbiter and the FSS. Third,
mechanical and man/machine interfaces exist between the crew-
member in the EMU and the MMU.
When not in use the MMU is stowed in the front of the payload bay
of the Orbiter on the FSS. Due to this location the MMU is
continually exposed to the space environment when in orbit. The
EMU to MMU interfaces are depicted in Figure 6. The MMU to FSS
interfaces envelopes in the payload bay are depicted in Figures 7
and 8.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 9 through 13 illustrate the hierarchical relationships
between the MMU, subsystems, and components employed for the
enclosed IOA analysis.
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Figure i0 - PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM HIERARCHY
17
eu_
m
vw
U_
L&J
W
_
Q. Q.
OO
"C Z
x_oj=
uu
-['-U I-_-
i zuJ
o__
7--1-I- -
-J _.)
..J
O
_ m
,aC
ZZ
I
b-. i n
zLL_
ULJ
m A
m
.<
0
,m
.J
.<
, _-,-I _ I = I01,_ I
] -,
Z31 uJ I ",.-
' • I "-_
I
uJ
0
Q.
0
)-
Figure ii - ELECTRICAL/POWER SUBSYSTEM HIERARCHY
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Figure 12 - HIERARCHY OF SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS
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Figure 13 - FSS HIERARCHY
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4.0 _SSESSNENT RESULTS
The MMU assessment was done based on the FMEA/CIL data received
from Martin Marietta dated January 5, 1987 (Reference 7).
Subsequent to the receipt of these data, a meeting was held on
April 14, 1987 with Ms. Susan Goudy of the Martin Marietta
Corporation and some of the significant issues were discussed.
Resolution of these issues remained for a later date, and was not
pursued after the cancellation of the Martin Marietta FMEA/CIL
task by NASA. In this report, an attempt has been made to
compare the IOA analysis results (Reference 6) to those of
Reference 7, and bring the assessment process up to date with
change 2 of NSTS-22206. some of the significant issues
identified are summarized below:
o The Martin Marietta analysis format lacked a
comprehensive definition of the flight phases, screens,
and the item(s) under study. All the flight phases
were not always analyzed for prep, ops, and post ops
for each failure mode. The screens A and B were not
specifically designated per NSTS-22206. IOA had to
interpret their status based on very limited
information provided. The screen C was not addressed,
and it was therefore left blank throughout the
assessment.
The Martin Marietta analysis did not address a specific
hardware item in some cases, but used an assembly
instead. This made it very difficult to investigate
failure modes and effects of a particular item and its
impact on the overall system.
o The MMU PREP and POST-OPS definitions were not too
clear and it was consequently difficult to match their
criticalities. IOA considered every MMU activity to
begin with PRE-OPS activities and end with POST-OPS
activities prior to the start of the next MMU OPS. The
Martin Marietta definition seems to suggest that the
PREP activities start with the first MMU PRE-OPS and
stop after the last MMU OPS activity. The period after
the last planned MMU OPS will then be POST-OPS.
o There were a number of issues related to the treatment
of the multi-position switches. The Martin Marietta
used a more broad and general failure mode approach,
such as open or closed. IOA considered and
investigated the failure of single contact positions
for open and closed and assigned the worst case
criticality. Multi-position switches to fail open or
closed were in general considered to be unreasonable.
o Electrical items, such as d_odes, resistors, relays,
etc., associated with an LRU circuit were not studied
by Martin Marietta. IOA provided analysis for these
items to be incorporated into the final FMEA/CIL study.
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The IOA analysis of the MMUhardware initially generated 136
failure mode worksheets and identified 69 Potential Critical
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order
to facilitate comparison, 57 additional failure mode analysis
worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 179 FMEAs and ii0 CIL
items, which was generated using the NSTS-22206 FMEA/CIL
instructions. Upon completion of the assessment, 121 of the 204
FMEAs remained as issues to be resolved. The explanations for
these issues are provided on individual assessment sheets in
Apendix C.
Appendix D highlights the NASA Critical Items and corresponding
IOA worksheet ID. Appendix E contains the IOA additional
analysis worksheets supplementing previous analysis. Appendix F
provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
Table I presents a summary of the FMEA and IOA criticalities and
the associated issue counts.
Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment Issues
Component NASA IOA Issues
Propulsion
Electrical/
Power
Structures and
Mechanism
FSS
32
78
29
40
36
87
35
46
19
5O
27
25
TOTAL 179 204 121
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Table II presents a summary of the CIL assessment issues that
exist for each component.
Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment Issues
Component NASA IOA Issues
Propulsion
Electrical/
Power
Structures and
Mechanism
FSS
22
49
24
15
28
43
17
7
16
37
23
16
TOTAL ii0 95 92
Table III presents a breakdown of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline.
TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality: i/I 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
Propulsion
Electrical/
Power
Structures and
Mechanism
FSS
TOTAL
1
9
I0
23
26
52
2
8
12
5
27
o
6
D
2
8
8
17
i0
27
62
2
21
i0
12
45
36
87
35
46
204
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Of the failure modes analyzed, ninety-five were determined to be
critical items, distributed throughout MMUas shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
Criticality:
Propulsion
Electrical/
Power
Structures and
Mechanism
FSS
1/1
i
9
2/IR
23
26
2/2
2
8
12
5
3/IR
I
u
3/2R
2
m
2
2
3/3
m
TOTAL
28
43
17
7
TOTAL 10 52 27 - 6 - 95
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers
Component IOA ID Number
Propulsion
Electrical/
Power
Structures and
Mechanism
FSS
MMU-100 to 127, 106A, 106B, I06C, 125A, 1001X,
1031X, 1051X, II41X, II91X, 1211X, 1212X,
1251X, 1252X, 1253X.
MMU-128 to 188, 130A, 131A, 134A, 135A, 144A,
145A, 146A, 151A, 152A, 153A, 154A, 157A,
169A, 171A, 174A, 177A, 178A, 179A, 185A,
1281X, 1681X, 1701X to 1704X, 1721X to 1724X,
1731X, 1861X, 1862X, 4015X.
MMU-189 to 207, 192A, 196A, 1891X to 1899X,
4000X, 4001X, 4005X, 4006X, 4012X, 4013X, 1981X
4014X.
MMU-208 to 245, 219A, 2111X, 2141X to 2144X,
2391X, 2392X, 4002X, 4003X, 4004X, 4007X to
4011X.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE} - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP__SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
B-3
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
i.
•
.
•
•
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 MMU Ground Rules and Assumptions
I , Loss of the MMU's automatic attitude hold capability
will not be considered life or vehicle threatening, or
a mission impact•
Rationale: To date no normal or contingency MMU
operation has been identified or envisioned
which would require the automatic attitude
hold capability•
• The availability of the Orbiter to perform a rescue of
a stranded crewperson will not be considered in
determining the criticality of the applicable failure
mode.
Rationale: The IOA project believes such an exclusion
is necessary to ensure worst case scenario
analysis results in the most appropriate
criticality•
• For all analyses, it is assumed that the MMU may be
required for planned or contingency operations anytime
up to initiation of the Orbiter deorbit phase•
Rationale: The above assumption ensures that failures
occuring subsequent to a MMU mission are
analyzed for their effect on subsequent MMU
missions.
• The following MMU flight phase definitions are
applicable for the analyses provided in Appendix C:
Pre-Ops: The timeframe extending from installation
in the Orbiter to removal of the MMU (on-
orbit) from the FSS
Ops: The on-orbit duration of time during which
the MMU is manned and not stowed in the FSS
Post-Ops: Any timeframe subsequent to on-orbit
stowage of the MMU and prior to Orbiter
mission completion
• Although two (2) MMUs are flown on each mission, criti-
cality assignment is performed without consideration to
the availability of the second MMU.
Rationale: The assignment of worst case criticality is
ensured by this assumption•
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This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-100
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: I00
ITEM: GN2 TANK
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-102
NASA FMEA #: 1.5.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 102
ITEM: TOGGLE VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE COULD NOT BE
DETECTED DURING FLIGHT UNTIL THE TIME WHEN ONE TANK IS TO BE
ISOLATED, OR A RECHARGE IS ATTEMPTED AFTER EVA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-103
NASA FMEA #: 1.5.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 103
ITEM: TOGGLE VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAIL CLOSED. IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD BE
LEFT BLANK.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-104
NASA FMEA #: 1.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 104
ITEM: ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] .[ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
VALVE FAILED OPEN IS NOMINAL OPERATING POSITION. HOWEVER, IT
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE GN2 TANK FROM
THRUSTERS IN THE EVENT OF A DOWNSTREAM LEAK. LOSS OF FUNCTIONAL
REDUNDANCY DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AS INDICATED BY THE
FMEA. IOA CONSIDERS EVA LOST WITH THIS HARDWARE CRITICALITY,
SINCE THIS FAILURE ALONE MAY BE ONE STEP AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE
(EVA CREW BEING STRANDED WITH THIS FAILURE AND A LEAK) - CANCEL
THE EVA AND RETURN TO ORBITER.
AN ITEM OF MAJOR CONCERN IS THAT THIS FAILURE WILL NOT BE
DETECTED UNTIL A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE WHICH REQUIRES ISOLATING THE
TANK FROM THE THRUSTERS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-105
NASA FMEA #: 1.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 105
ITEM: ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA CRITICALITY. HOWEVER THIS FAILURE WILL
NOT BE DETECTED UNTIL THRUSTERS ARE TO BE FIRED, AND THEN THE EVA
CREWPERSON COULD NOT DISTINGUISH THIS FAILURE FROM A SIMILAR
FAILURE FROM REGULATORS, OR THRUSTERS SOLENOID VALVES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-106
NASA FMEA #: 1.7.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
106
GN2 LINES (ISOL VLV - REGULATOR)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] IN]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAK. THE FMEA CRITICALITY ASSUMES POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO
SHARPNEL AFTER LINE RUPTURE. IOA FEELS THAT FAILURE MODE
"RUPTURE" IN THE LINE TO BE NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. THEREFORE ANY
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WILL FORCE CLOSING THE ISOLATION VALVE, THUS
LOSS OF A SYSTEM (MISSION IMPACT). AND WITH LOSS OF BOTH SYSTEMS
(TWO LINES LEAK) DURING OPS, THE CREWPERSON IS SUBJECT TO BEING
STRANDED-POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-106A
NASA FMEA #: 1.7.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU
106
GN2 LINES (REG-THRUSTERS)
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] IN]
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAK. THE FMEA CRITICALITY ASSUMES POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO
SHARPNEL AFTER LINE RUPTURE. IOA FEELS THAT FAILURE MODE
"RUPTURE" IN THE LINE TO BE NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. THEREFORE ANY
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WILL FORCE CLOSING THE ISOLATION VALVE, THUS
LOSS OF A SYSTEM (MISSION IMPACT). AND WITH LOSS OF BOTH SYSTEMS
(TWO LINES LEAK) DURING OPS, THE CREWPERSON IS SUBJECT TO BEING
STRANDED-POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-106B
NASA FMEA #: 1.7.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
106
GN2 LINES (XFEED VLV - XFEED VLV)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAK. A LEAK IN THIS AREA (BETWEEN XFEED VALVES) HAS NO
IMMEDIATE EFFECT SINCE THE TANKS ARE CHARGED PRELAUNCH, AND THE
XFEED VALVES REMAIN CLOSED THROUGHOUT PRE-OPS AND OPS. HOWEVER,
DURING POST-OPS RECHARGE CAPABILITY WILL BE LOST IN SUBSEQUENT
EVA/MMU ACTIVITIES. ALSO IT WILL CREATE CONDIJTION FOR A
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE IF ONE/TWO OR XFEED VALVES WERE TO FAIL
OPEN DURING OPS THIS FAILURE IS NOT DETECTED DURING PRE-OPS AND
OPS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MMU-106C BASELINE [ ]
1.7.2 NEW [ X ]
MMU
106
GN2 LINES (TANK-ISOL VLV)
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAK. LOSS OF GN2 RESULTING IN LOSS OF A SYSTEM. LOSS OF BOTH
SYSTEMS (REDUNDANCY FAILURE) DURINGS OPS COULD BE CATASTROPHIC.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU-II0
MMU
ii0
THRUSTER MANIFOLD
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LEAK.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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_SESS_NT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: _n_U-lll
NASA F_A #:
N_A DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: iii
ITEm4: I_4RUSTER M_IFOLD
LEAD A/qALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
_SESS_NT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMP_d_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECO_fENDATIONS: (If different from N_A)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL P_TENTION RATIONAI_: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REM_:
CONSTRIC_fION.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-II2
NASA FMEA #: 1.6.2
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 112
ITEM: THRUSTER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[p] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-II3
NASA FMEA #: 1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 113
ITEM: THRUSTER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL CLOSED. LOSS OF CONTROL, SAT STAT, AND AAH RESULTING IN
MISSION IMPACT OR EVA LOSS. FUNCTIONAL LOSS WILL LEAVE THE EVA
CREWPERSON STRANDED DURING OPS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-II4
1.6.3
MMU
114
THRUSTER
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
C ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BASED ON THE EXPLANATION GIVEN IN MMU-
113.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-II6
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 116
ITEM: GN2 REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST : DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] C N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE DURING PRE-OPS
AND POST-OPS WILL NOT BE DETECTED, AND DURING OPS PHASE IT CANNOT
BE DISTINGUISHED FROM A SIMILAR FAILURE FROM OTHER VALVES IN THE
LINE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-II7
1.2.3
MMU
117
GN2 REGULATOR
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-II9
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 119
ITEM: GN2 REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] C p ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF PRESSURE REGULATION WITH VERY LOW TOLERANCE. FUNCTIONAL
LOSS DURING OPS MAY LEAVE THE CREW STRANDED - POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE. THE FAILURE MODE MAY BE MORE APPROPRIATELY CALLED OUT OF
TOLERANCE (HIGH/LOW RESPONSE) - SEE MMU-1191.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-120
1.2.2
MMU
120
GN2 RELIEF VALVE
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. IOA WITHDRAWS THE CAUSES OF THE
FAILURE AND ACCEPTS THE FMEA CAUSES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-121
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 121
ITEM: GN2 RELIEF VALVE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL CLOSED. THE RELIEF VALVE FAILED CLOSED DOES NOT POSE ANY
IMMEDIATE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THE VENT CAPABILITY IS LOST AND NOT
AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED AFTER A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE, LIKE REGULATOR
FAILED OPEN. KNOWING THIS SCENARIO, THIS FAILURE WILL
THEREFORE CREATE A CONDITION THAT IS NOT ADVISABLE TO CONTINUE
THE MISSION, BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS REGULATOR FAILED OPEN
COULD BE CATASTROPHIC DURING OPS PHASE. THIS FAILURE IS FURTHER
COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE UNTIL
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE (BEG FAILED OPEN).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-122
NASA FMEA #: 1.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 122
ITEM: PRESSURE GAGE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-123
NASA FMEA #: 1.8.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 123
ITEM: PRESSURE GAGE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ACCURATE GN2 PRESSURE INDICATION - EVA CREW PERSON WILL
NOT KNOW QUANTITY OF PROPELLANT REMAINING TO SUCCESSFULLY
CONTINUE EVA. EVA CREW PERSON MUST RELY ON OTHER GAGE OR GROUND
INSTRUCTION. ANOMALY IN THE TWO GAGE READINGS WILL INDICATE AN
ERROR.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID :
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-124
1.8.2
MMU
124
PRESSURE GAGE
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
C p ]
[ F ]
[N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ACCURATE GN2 PRESSURE INDICATION - EVA CREW PERSON WILL
NOT KNOW QUANTITY OF PROPELLANT REMAINING TO SUCCESSFULLY
CONTINUE EVA. EVA CREW PERSON MUST RELY ON OTHER GAGE OR GROUND
INSTRUCTION. ANOMALY IN THE TWO GAGE READINGS WILL INDICATE AN
ERROR.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-125
NASA FMEA #: 1.3.2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU
125
RECHARGE QUICK DISCONNECT
COMPARE [ / ]
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN/LEAK. NO IMPACT SINCE THE XFEED VALVES ARE CLOSED, AND
FURTHERMORE, THE QD's HAVE CAP's INSTALLED AFTER DISCONNECT FROM
THE FSS. DURING PRE/POST-OPS, NO IMPACT IS SEEN SINCE THE TANKS
CAN BE RECHARGED AND ISOLATED BY THE XFEED VALVES.
THIS FAILURE WILL NOT BE READILY DETECTED. THE FMEA SEEMS TO BE
IN CONFLICT/INCONSISTENT WHEN COMPARED TO 1.3.5.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-125A
NASA FMEA #: 1.3.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
125
RECHARGE QUICK DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN/LEAK. NO IMPACT SINCE THE XFEED VALVES ARE CLOSED, AND
FURTHERMORE, THE QD's HAVE CAP's INSTALLED AFTER DISCONNECT FROM
THE FSS. DURING PRE/POST-OPS, NO IMPACT IS SEEN SINCE THE TANKS
CAN BE RECHARGED AND ISOLATED BY THE XFEED VALVES.
THIS FAILURE WILL NOT BE READILY DETECTED. THE FMEA SEEMS TO BE
IN CONFLICT/INCONSISTENT WHEN COMPARED TO 1.3.5.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-126
NASA FMEA #: 1.3.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
126
RECHARGE QUICK DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT RECHARGE
CAPABILITY/ACTIVITY IS PART OF THE POST-OPS PHASE AND NOT PREP AS
INDICATED BY THE FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-127
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 127
ITEM: GN2 TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-128
NASA FMEA #: 3.11.1
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 128
ITEM: BATTERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MMU-129
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
129
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
C ]
CP]
CN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-130
NASA FMEA #: 3.14.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU
130
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EFFECT DURING MMU OPS SINCE THIS IS NORMAL POSITION. DURING
THE FIRST PRE AND POST-OPS IT WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT
ORBITER POWER TO STORAGE HEATERS. IOA CONSIDERED THIS TO RESULT
IN LOSS OF CEA/BATTERY DUE TO COLD/UNDER TEMPERATURE CEA LIMIT
VIOLATION - THUS LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM. HOWEVER, IOA ALSO
RECOGNIZES THAT A POSSIBILITY EXISTS TO PROVIDE POWER TO THE
STORAGE HEATERS BY TURNING THE MAIN POWER SWITCH ON WHILE
RECHARGING THE BATTERY - THIS OPERATION COULD BE MONITORED IN THE
AIRLOCK, BUT THE EFFECT OF 28V POWER TO OTHER ELECTRICAL
COMPONENT IS NOT INVESTIGATED. FINALLY, THIS FAILURE HAS NO
EFFECT (3/3) ON MISSIONS WITH ONLY ONE MMU ACTIVITY, AND WILL BE
LOSS OF MISSION FOR MULTIPLE MMU OPS AS SHOWN ABOVE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU-130A
3.14.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
130
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE MODE, ELECTRICALLY FAILS IN INT POSITION, AS STATED
BY THE FMEA, IS NOT CREDIBLE. THE SWITCH IS A MULTI-
POSITION/CONTACT SWITCH AND IT WILL BE ONLY APPROPRIATE TO
CONSIDER "A SINGLE CONTACT OPEN" - IN THIS CASE, THE WORST SINGLE
CONTACT OPEN IS FOR EXTERNAL POWER TO THE STORAGE HEATERS DURING
PRE/POST OPS ACTIVITY, OR MAIN POWER CONTACT OPEN (PINS 5-6)
DURING OPS ACTIVITY. EITHER ONE OF THESE FAILURES, CONSIDERED
SEPARATELY, WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF A SYSTEM, THUS EVA
TERMINATION AS EXPLAINED BY MMU-130. SEE ALSO MMU-131A FOR A
SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED FAILURE MODES. THOSE ANALYSIS MAY HAVE TO
BE RE-WRITTEN TO CLARIFY THE FAILURE MODES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-131
NASA FMEA #: 3.14.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
131
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] C ] C ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO EFFECT DURING PRE/POST OPS ACTIVITY SINCE THAT IS ITS NOMINAL
POSITION. DURING OPS AND WITH INADVERTENT SWITCHING TO EXT
POSITION (OTHERWISE IT IS NOT APPLICABLE), BATTERY POWER WILL BE
DENIED TO ONE SYSTEM - LOSS OF A SYSTEM. MISSIONS WITH SAT-STAT
REQUIREMENT CAN NOT BE MET. FUNCTIONAL LOSS MAY STRAND THE CREW
WITH NO THRUSTER POWER TO RETURN TO ORBITER.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MMU-131A
3.14.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
131
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER SWITCH
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [N]
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA FAILURE MODE WAS CONSIDERED NON-CREDIBLE, SINCE THE
SWITCH IS A MULTI POSITION/CONTACT SWITCH. IT WILL BE MORE
APPROPRIATE TO FAIL CLOSED THE SWITCH IN ONE SINGLE CONTACT AT
THE TIME. ANY SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED FROM EXT/INT PINS HAS NO
EFFECT WHEN THE SWITCH IS AT EXT/INT POSITION ACCORDINGLY -
NOMINAL POSITION. A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED ON EXT PINS WHEN THE
SWITCH IS IN INT HAS NO EFFECT ALSO SINCE THE MMU IS DURING OPS
AND SEPARATED FROM ORBITER POWER. ON THE OTHER HAND,
A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED FROM INT PINS WHEN THE SWITCH IS IN EXT
POSITION WILL HAVE A POSSIBILITY OF DRAINING POWER FROM ORBITER
AND THE BATTERIES IF THE MAIN POWER SWITCH REMAINS ON. THIS CASE
WAS REJECTED SINCE DURING EXT POWER NOMINAL CREW ACTION
WILL TURN OFF BATTERY POWER.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-132
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 132
ITEM: TERMINAL BOARD
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU-133
MMU
133
TERMINAL BOARD
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] C P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-134
NASA FMEA #: 3.13.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 134
ITEM: MAIN POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA CONSIDERED THIS FAILURE DURING PREP ONLY WHEN THE
BATTERY POWER IS TURNED OFF (SWITCH OFF). HOWEVER, DURING OPS
PERIOD, THE INADVERTENT SWITCHING ACTION TO OFF POSITION MUST BE
CONSIDERED DUE TO SHOCK OR VIBRATION. THIS LATER CASE MAY BE
ANALYZED BY A SEPARATE FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-134A
NASA FMEA #: 3.13.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
134
MAIN POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST : DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL _RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE SHOULD ONLY CONSIDER A SINGLE CONTACT OPEN OR CLOSED
AT A TIME. A COMPLETE LOSS OF POWER REQUIRES BOTH CONTACTS TO BE
OPEN - NON-CREDIBLE. THIS ANALYSIS IS DONE FOR A SINGLE CONTACT
OPEN - SEE ALSO MMU-135A FOR A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED.
LOSS OF BATTERY RECHARGE CAPABILITY DURING PRE/POST OPS,
OTHERWISE NO EFFECT SINCE THE BATTERY POWER CAN BE MAINTAINED
THROUGH A REDUNDANT CONTACT ON THE SWITCH. LOSS OF RECHARGE
CAPABILITY WILL PRECLUDE SUBSEQUENT EVA/MMU ACTIVITIES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-135
NASA FMEA #: 3.13.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
135
MAIN POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] CP] CP]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-135A
NASA FMEA #: 3.13.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 135
ITEM: MAIN POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE DURING THE FIRST PRE-OPS WILL APPLY A 28V POWER TO
THE BATTERY. THIS MAY RESULT IN BATTERY EXPLOSION CAUSING A
POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-136
NASA FMEA #: 3.9.1
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 136
ITEM: LTS/HTR.cb
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C P ] C P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-137
NASA FMEA # : 3.9.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 137
ITEM: LTS/HTR.Cb
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
r
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA AND ORIGINAL IOA STUDY ASSUMED THAT A FAILURE (OVER
CURRENT) HAS ALREADY OCCURED AND THE CB HAS ALSO FAILED CLOSED.
THIS SCENARIO IS MULTIPLE FAILURE CASE FOR WHICH THE FAILURES
SHOULD BE STUDIED SEPARATELY.
THE CB FAILED CLOSED HAS NO CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECT, AND NOT
DETECTABLE UNLESS ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURS. AT ANY RATE, POWER TO
THE LIGHTS/HEATERS CAN ALSO BE CUT OFF BY EXT/INT SWITCH AND/OR
MAIN POWER SWITCH TO COMPENSATE FOR THE BREAKERS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-138
NASA FMEA #: 3.8.1
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 138
ITEM: CEA CIRCUIT BREAKER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (I f different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE :
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MMU-139 BASELINE [ ]
3.8.2 NEW [ X ]
MMU
139
CEA CIRCUIT BREAKER
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA AND ORIGINAL IOA STUDY ASSUMED A FAILURE ALREADY IN PROGRESS
WHICH DRAWS OVERCURRENT AND THE CB HAS FAILED CLOSED. THIS IS
MULTIPLE FAILURE SCENARIO AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA
PROCEDURE. THIS FAILURE POSES NO MAJOR PROBLEM EXCEPT FOR LOSS
OF ABILITY TO DENY POWER TO THE CEA. HOWEVER, THE POWER MAY BE
DENIED BY CEA OR MAIN POWER SWITCH IF NEEDED. THIS FAILURE IS
NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL AN OVERCURRENT FAILURE OCCURS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-140
NASA FMEA #: 3.10.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 140
ITEM: GYRO PWR cb
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REN_:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-141
NASA FMEA #: 3.10.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 141
ITEM: GYRO PWR cb
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[323 ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [D3
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA AND ORIGINAL IOA STUDY ASSUMED A FAILURE ALREADY IN PROGRESS
WHICH DREW OVERCURRENT WHILE THE CB HAD FAILED CLOSED. THIS
SCENARIO IS MULTIPLE FAILURE CASE AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED.
THIS CB FAILED CLOSED HAS NO EFFECT SINCE IT HAS FAILED IN ITS
NOMINAL POSITION. THE FAILURE WILL HOWEVER DENY CAPABILITY TO
OPEN THE CIRCUIT, BUT THIS COULD BE MANUALLY DONE BY GYRO POWER
SWITCH OR MAIN POWER SWITCH.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-142
NASA FMEA #: 3.7.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 142
ITEM: VDA cb
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-143
NASA FMEA #: 3.7.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 143
ITEM: VDA cb
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/ NC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA AND ORIGINAL IOA STUDY ASSUMED A FAILURE ALREADY IN
PROGRESS WHICH DRAWS OVERCURRENT WHILE THE CB HAS FAILED CLOSED.
THIS CASE IS MULTIPLE FAILURE SCENARIO AND SHOULD NOT DRIVE THE
CRITICALITY. THE CB FAILURE ALONE IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM THIS
SCENARIO WHICH IS CONSIDERED LOSS OF MISSION. THIS FAILURE POSES
NO IMMEDIATE THREAT SINCE THE CB HAS FAILED IN ITS NOMINAL
POSITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-144
NASA FMEA #: 3.17.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
144
LOCATOR LIGHT SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS DO NOT APPLY - SHOULD
BE LEFT BLANK.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-144A
NASA FMEA #: 3.17.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
144
LOCATOR LIGHT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA CRIT WITH THE FOLLOWING TWO COMMENTS: I)
SCREENS DO NOT APPLY - SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK 2) THE FAILURE MODE
SHOULD ADDRESS ANY SINGLE CONTACT FAILED IN EITHER OPEN OR CLOSED
POSITION. THIS FAILURE SEEMS TO BE A SINGLE CONTACT
OPEN - SEE ALSO MMU-145A FOR A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-49
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-145
NASA FMEA #: 3.17.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
145
LOCATOR LIGHT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-145A
NASA FMEA # : 3.17.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
145
LOCATOR LIGHT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK.
ALSO THE FAILURE MODE IS MORE APPROPRIATELY DEFINED AS A SINGLE
CONTACT CLOSED FOR THIS CASE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-146
NASA FMEA #: 3.17.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
146
LOCATOR LIGHT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-146A
NASA FMEA #: 3.17.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
146
LOCATOR LIGHT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK.
ALSO, THE FAILURE MODE IS MORE APPROPRIATELY STATED AS A SINGLE
CONTACT CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-147
NASA FMEA #: 3.18.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
147
LOCATOR LIGHT POWER CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
C P ] [ P ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
MMU-148 BASELINE [ ]
3.19.1 NEW [ X ]
MMU
148
LIGHT
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-149
NASA FMEA #: 3.16.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 149
ITEM: GYRO POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ N ] C N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THE ABOVE CRITICALITY BASED ON THE FMEA
EXPLANATION GIVEN FOR THE GYROS CIRCUIT BREAKER 3.10.2, THAT IS:
- COMPLETE LOSS OF GYROS WILL ALSO NEGATE THE FUNCTION OF AAH &
ALT ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR SOME
MISSIONS.
- CREW MAY MAINTAIN ALTITUDE MANUALLY AS A BACK-UP REDUNDANCY TO
AUTOMATIC CONTROL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-150
NASA FMEA #: 3.16.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 150
ITEM: GYRO POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-151
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 151
ITEM: GYRO POWER SUPPLY
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS FAILURE WILL PREVENT AAH OPERATION, BUT, MANUAL ATTITUDE
CONTROL IS AVAILABLE THROUGH RHC TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS.
HOWEVER, SOME MISSIONS (SOLAR MAX) WILL REQUIRE AAH OPERATION IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE ALT CONTROL SWITCH. LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION
AND RHC WILL PRECLUDE Y,R,P SEQUENCE, THUS LOSS OF MISSION AND
RETURN TO THE ORBITER - SEE ALSO 3.10.2 FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-151A
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 151
ITEM: GYRO POWER SUPPLY
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ p ] [ P ] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WILL PREVENT AAH OPERATION, BUT, MANUAL ATTITUDE
CONTROL IS AVAILABLE THROUGH RHC TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS.
HOWEVER, SOME MISSIONS (SOLAR MAX) WILL REQUIRE AAH OPERATION IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE ALT CONTROL SWITCH. LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION
AND RHC WILL PRECLUDE Y,R,P SEQUENCE, THUS LOSS OF MISSION AND
RETURN TO THE ORBITER - SEE ALSO 3.10.2 FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-152
NASA FMEA #: 3.12.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 152
ITEM: CEA POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] ,[ N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE PREP CRITICALITY AND REJECTS THIS FAILURE MODE
FOR THE FLIGHT PHASE DUE TO FOLLOWING REMARKS: i) THE FAILURE
MODE "MECHANICALLY JAMS IN ISO" IS NOT REALISTIC BECAUSE THE
SWITCH IS PLACED IN "ON" POSITION THROUGHOUT THE FLIGHT PHASE,
AND NO MORE CREW ACTION IS ANTICIPATED/REQUIRED, 2) THE FMEA
ASSUMES A FAII//RE ALREADY IN PROGRESS WHICH WOULD WARRANT
SWITCHING ACTION FROM "ON" TO "ISO", AND THEN JAMMING IN "ISO"
POSITION. THIS IS MULTIPLE FAILURE SCENARIO, AND INCONSISTENT
WITH THE NSTS-22206 GROUND RULES, 3) AN INADVERTENT OPERATION
DOES NOT APPLY EITHER BECAUSE IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A 2/IR CRIT,
THE SWITCH MUST GO THROUGH TWO FAILURES: A. INADVERTENT
OPERATION FROM "ON" TO "ISO", B. "ISO" POSITION JAMMED
RIGHT AFTER INADVERTENT OPERATION WHICH WOULD PREVENT THE EVA
CREW FROM REACTIVATING/SWITCHING BACK TO "ON" POSITION.
THEREFORE, FLIGHT CRITICALITY IS NOT APPLICABLE, AND PREP CRIT IS
ACCEPTED WHICH WOULD PREVENT FLIGHT PHASE MMU OPS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-152A
NASA FMEA #: 3.12.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 152
ITEM: CEA POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE STUDIED
FOR A SINGLE CONTACT OPEN AND CLOSED. THIS FMEA SEEM TO BE A
SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED IN ISO PINS DUE TO CONTAMINATION/CORROSION.
HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SWITCH BEING IN "ON"
POSITION (DURING FLIGHT) AND HAVING A SHORT ACROSS "ISO" OR "OFF"
POSITIONS SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO THE
ISOLATION VALVE POSITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-153
NASA FMEA #: 3.12.3
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 153
ITEM: CEA POWER SWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] IF]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE OF THIS SWITCH (MECHANICALLY JAMMED IN "ON" POSITION)
POSES NO IMMEDIATE PROBLEM SINCE IT FAILED IN NORMAL OPERATING
POSITION. HOWEVER, IT WILL DENY CAPABILITY FOR CLOSING A SYSTEM
CEA DUE TO A FAILURE - THIS ACTION CAN BE COMPENSATED FOR,
THROUGH MAIN POWER SWITCH OR THE THC HANDLE (SHUTS OFF BOTH ISO
VALVE, TURN OFF MAIN POWER SWITCHES, REACTIVATES THE GOOD MAIN
POWER SWITCH) AND RETURN TO ORBITER.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-153A
NASA FMEA #: 3.12.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 153
ITEM: CEA POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ Y ]
[ ] [ ] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]. [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE (ELECTRONICALLY FAILS "ON") IS MORE APPROPRIATELY
IDENTIFIED AS A SINGLE CONTACT OPEN FOR EITHER "ISO" OR "OFF"
POSITIONS. THE INABILITY TO TURN OFF A CEA WILL HAVE THE SAME
EFFECT AS THE SWITCH FAILED MECHANICALLY IN "ON" POSITION
- MMU-153.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-154
NASA FMEA #: 3.12.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 154
ITEM: CEA POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST : DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] C ] [ ]_ [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE PREP PHASE CRITICALITY, BUT REJECTS THE OPS/FLT
PHASE CRITICALITY BASED ON THE EXPLANATION GIVEN FOR MMU-152.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-154A
NASA FMEA #: 3.12.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 154
ITEM: CEA POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE CRITICALITY, BUT SUGGEST THAT THE FAILURE MODE BE
IDENTIFIED AS A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED (IN THIS FMEA, PINS "OFF").
HOWEVER, DURING OPS WHEN THE SWITCH IS ON, AND THE "OFF" PINS ARE
CLOSED - THE FAILURE MUST BE INVESTIGATED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-155
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 155
ITEM: CEA POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] C ] C ]
CP] CP] CP]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE IS SAME AS EITHER "FAILED IN ON" OR "FAILED IN
OFF" AS STUDIED BY MMU-153 AND MMU-154 RESPECTIVELY. THIS
ANALYSIS MAY BE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-156
NASA FMEA #: 3.21.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 156
ITEM: PRESSURE GAGE LIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, SINCE THE TOTAL LOSS OF PRESSURE GAGES
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWPERSON ABILITY TO DETECT GN2 LEVEL AND
GN2 LEAK; WHICH MAY JEPARDIZE THE CREWPERSON'S SAFETY.
THEREFORE, IOA AGREES TO CANCEL THE MMU AFTER FUNCTIONAL LOSS AND
RETURN TO THE ORBITER. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THIS
DECISION WILL BE MOST LIKELY MADE REAL TIME DEPENDENT UPON THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-157
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 157
ITEM: THRUSTER CUE LT.
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH FMEA, BUT THE SCREEN SHOULD BE LEFT
BLANK. SEE ALSO MMU-157A (3.20.1).
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-157A
NASA FMEA #: 3.20.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 157
ITEM: THRUSTER CUE LT.
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREEN SHOULD BE LEFT
BLANK. ALSO SEE MMU-157 (3.3.4).
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-158
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
158
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
C / ] [ ]
[ 2/iR] C P 3
C ] C ]
CP] CP]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WOP_KSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: _4U-159
NASA _4EA #: 3.3.1
N_A DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
159
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY
I_EAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUND_NCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [N] [ ]
P_CO_fENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA, HOWEVER, EACH PIECE OF
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN THE CEA SHOULD BE STUDIED SEPARATELY AND
ITS FAILURE MODE(S) INVESTIGATED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-160
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
160
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ERRATIC RESPONSE FROM THE THRUSTERS MAY FORCE THE EVA
CREWPERSON TO SHUTDOWN A SYSTEM IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE
CONTROL. LOSS OF BOTH SIDES UNDER SEVER ERRATIC RESPONSE MAY
LEAVE THE EVA CREWPERSON STRANDED. SEE ALSO NOTE MMU-159.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MMU-161
3.3.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
161
CONTROL ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] IN]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ERRATIC RESPONSE FROM THE THRUSTERS MAY FORCE THE EVA
CREWPERSON TO SHUTDOWN A SYSTEM IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE
CONTROL. LOSS OF BOTH SIDES UNDER SEVER ERRATIC RESPONSE MAY
LEAVE THE EVA CREWPERSON STRANDED. SEE ALSO NOTE MMU-159.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-162
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
162
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-163
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
163
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-164
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
164
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONTINUOUS SIGNAL TO THE ISOLATION VALVE MOTOR TO CLOSE THE VALVE
MAY BURN THE MOTOR AND DRAIN THE BATTERY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-166
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
166
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA - SEE ALSO REMARKS FOR MMU-159.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-167
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
167
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
FAIL ON
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-168
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
168
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NOISY
THIS ANALYSIS MAY BE WITHDRAWN.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-169
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
169
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ X ] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS.-
FAIL ON 1-3 AXES
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
MMU-169A
3.2.2
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
169
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
CP]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [P] [ P] [ P]
* CILRETENTIONRATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL ON 1-3 AXES
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-170
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
170
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT AND CORRESPONDING WORKSHEETS ARE VOIDED. THEY
ARE SUPERCEEDED BY ITEMS MMU 1701X, 1702X, 1703X, AND 1704X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-171
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
171
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL ON (1-3 AXES)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-171A
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
171
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL ON (1-3 AXES). FAILURE CANNOT BE ISOLATED. ABORT REQUIRED.
RESCUE REQUIRED. CREW PERSON STRANDED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-172
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
172
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OFF (1-3 AXES). THIS ASSESSMENT AND CORRESPONDING ANALYSIS
WORKSHEETS ARE VOIDED. THEY ARE REPLACED WITH ITEMS MMU-1721X,
1722X, 1723X, AND 1724X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-173
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
173
THC ISOLATE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /1 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE FAILURE IS ELECTRICAL, ISO SWITCH HAS ONE BACKUP IN THE
ALTERNATE SYSTEM. IF THE FUNCTION IS LOST, THE ISO VALVES ARE
CLOSED. THE PILOT IS STRANDED WITH NO PROPULSIVE POWER. IOA
ACCEPTS THE CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-174
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 174
ITEM: THC ISOLATE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
,[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE THC ISOLATE SWITCH IS ONLY USED DURING CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS
DURING FLIGHT. UNDER THIS SCENARIO, THE PILOT HAS NO OTHER
BACKUP TO STOP THE EXISTING PROPULSION/LEAK. ORBITER RESCUE IS
NOT CONSIDERED AS CONTINGENCY FOR COMPONENT FAILURE MODE EFFECTS
ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-174A
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
174
THC ISOLATE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/.1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OFF. THE THC ISOLATE SWITCH IS ONLY USED DURING CONTINGENCY
SITUATIONS DURING FLIGHT. UNDER THIS SCENARIO, THE PILOT HAS NO
OTHER BACKUP TO STOP THE EXISTING PROPULSION/LEAK. OTHER RESCUE
IS NOT CONSIDERED AS CONTINGENCY FOR COMPONENT FAILURE
MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU-175
3.1.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
175
AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD SWITCH
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAIL ON. THERE IS NO MISSION IMPACT. AAH IS ACTIVE WHEN GYRO
POWER IS ON. EXCESSIVE USE OF PROPELLANT CAN BE AVOIDED BY
TURNING GYRO POWER OFF FOR ROTATIONAL MANEUVERS. IOA ACCEPTS THE
FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-176
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
176
AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OFF. THE PURPOSE OF THE AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD IS TO EASE
THE PILOT WORKLOAD WHILE SAVING GAS. THIS IS DONE BY
AUTOMATICALLY CONTROLLING THE PITCH, YAW, AND ROLL OF THE MMU.
THE FAILURE OF THIS ITEM MAY HAVE MISSION IMPACT. THE DEGREE OF
SEVERITY HAS TO BE JUDGE REAL TIME DEPENDING ON TIME OF FAILURE,
REMAINING MISSION DIFFICULTY, AND AMOUNT OF GAS LEFT IN THE
TANKS.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-90
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-177
NASA FMEA #: 3.15.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
177
ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE IS "FAILS IN NORM". THE PILOT WORKLOAD MAY BE
INCREASED BY THE INABILITY TO ENGAGE AAH WITH AXIS INHIBIT. IN
ADDITION, SATELLITE STABILIZATION CANNOT BE PERFORMED DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO ENGAGE THE THRUSTER LOGIC. FURTHER, BOTH
OPERATIONS PERFORMED MANUALLY WILL REQUIREMORE TIME AND GAS.
THE COMBINATIONS OF UNCERTANINTIES WILL HAVE TO BE EVALUATED AND
A GO/NO GO DECISION MADE REAL TIME.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-177A
NASA FMEA #: 3.15.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
177
ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE MODE IS "FAILS IN NORM". THE PILOT WORKLOAD MAY BE
INCREASED BY THE INABILITY TO ENGAGE AAH WITH AXIS INHIBIT. IN
ADDITION, SATELLITE STABILIZATION CANNOT BE PERFORMED DUE TO THE
INABILITY TO ENGAGE THE THRUSTER LOGIC. FURTHER, BOTH
OPERATIONS PERFORMED MANUALLY WILL REQUIRE MORE TIME AND GAS.
THE COMBINATIONS OF UNCERTAINTIES WILL HAVE TO BE EVALUATED AND A
GO/NO GO DECISION MADE REAL TIME.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MMU-178
3.15.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
178
ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SWITCH
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ ] IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ .1 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL ON SATELLITE STABILIZER. THIS FAILURE MAY TERMINATE MISSION
DUE TO THE PILOT INABILITY TO CONTROL TRANSLATIONS AND THE HIGH
RATE OF GAS USED. PILOT'S ACTION IS REQUIRED TO TURN OFF ONE CEA
SIDE TO INITIATE BACKUP LOGIC. UNDER THIS MODE, THE AAH
DOES NOT OPERATE, WHICH ITSELF IS A MISSION IMPACT DUE TO HIGHER
RATE OF GAS USED (SEE MMU-176) AND INABILITY TO USE AXIS INHIBIT.
THE MISSION SCENARIO WILL HAVE TO BE EVALUATED AND A GO/NO GO
DECISION MADE REAL TIME. IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-178A
NASA FMEA #: 3.15.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
178
ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[p] [F] IF]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL ON SATELLITE STABILIZER. SEE REMARKS FOR MMU-178-IOA AGREES
WITH THE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-179
NASA FMEA #: 3.15.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
179
ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL ON IN "AXIS INHIBIT". THE SYSTEM FAILS TO FLY AAH IN THE
SELECTED AXIS AND ENGAGE SATELLITE STABILIZATION WHEN NEEDED.
THERE MAY BE MISSION IMPACT DUE TO INCREASED PILOT WORKLOAD, AND
USE OF GAS. THE MISSION SCENARIO WILL HAVE TO BE EVALUATED
AND A GO/NO GO DECISION MADE REAL TIME.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-179A
NASA FMEA #: 3.15.6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU
179
ALTERNATE CONTROL MODES SWITCH
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE SYSTEM FAILS TO FLY AAH IN THE SELECTED AXIS AND ENGAGE
SATELLITE STABILIZATION WHEN NEEDED. THERE MAY BE MISSION IMPACT
DUE TO INCREASED PILOT WORKLOAD, AND USE OF GAS. THE MISSION
SCENARIO WILL HAVE TO BE EVALUATED AND GO/NO GO DECISION MADE
REAL TIME.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-180
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
180
GYRO PHASE PLANE LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST : DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS OFF 1-3 CH. AUTOMATIC ATTITUDE HOLD DOES NOT WORK WITHOUT
THIS ITEM, SEE MMU-176.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-181
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
181
GYRO PHASE PLANE LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NOISY/FALSE OUTPUTS. THIS FAILURE WILL FORCE THE SHUTDOWN OF
AAH, SEE MMU-176.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-182
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 182
ITEM: CEA PWR SPLY
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
.[ / ] [ ] [ 1 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-183
NASA FMEA #: 3.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 183
ITEM: WIRE HARNESS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SHORT OR OPEN CIRCUIT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-100
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-184
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
184
EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ F ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN, 1 OR MORE PINS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-101
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-185
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 185
ITEM: HEATERS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
ix]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OFF. HEATER FUNCTION IS TO MAINTAIN THE MMU AND FSS
STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE TEMPERATURE RANGE.
FAILURE OF A HEATER WILL BE NOTICED BY THE PILOT DUE TO SLUGGISH
PERFORMANCE OR FREEZE UP, WITH EXCEPTION OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER
PANEL, CEA CASE, AND LOCATOR LIGHT CONTROL (FOR THIS REASON
SCREEN B IS FAILED). SECOND SYSTEM HEATER FAILURE IS LIFE
THREATENING. IOA AGREES WITH FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-185A
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 185
ITEM: HEATERS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
FAIL OFF. HEATER FUNCTION IS TO MAINTAIN THE MMU AND FSS
STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE TEMPERATURE RANGE.
FAILURE OF A HEATER WILL BE NOTICED BY THE PILOT DUE TO SLUGGISH
PERFORMANCE OR FREEZE UP, WITH EXCEPTION OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER
PANEL, CEA CASES, AND LOCATOR LIGHT CONTROL (FOR THIS REASON
SCREEN B IS FAILED). SECOND SYSTEM HEATER FAILURE IS LIFE
THREATENING.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-186
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 186
ITEM: HEATERS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL ON (CEA). THIS FMEA IS VOIDED. THE ITEM FAILED IS THE
THERMOSTAT FOR THE CEA HEATERS. THIS ITEM AND FAILURE ARE
COVERED WITH FMEA 1861 AND ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET MMU-1861.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I04
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-187
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 187
ITEM: GYROS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DRIFT WITH DEGRADED GYRO PERFORMANCE AAH CANNOT OPERATE, SEE MMU-
176.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-105
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-188
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 188
ITEM: GYROS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (I f different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
FAIL OFF WITHOUT GYROS AAH DOES NOT OPERATE, SEE MMU-176.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-189
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 189
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ARM DOES NOT LATCH TO FLIGHT POSITION (UNLATCHED, LATCHED STOWED,
LATCHED WORKSITE, LATCHED FLIGHT). THIS ASSESSMENT AND FMEA
WORKSHEET ASSOCIATED WITH IT (MMU-189 AND 189, RESPECTIVELY) ARE
VOIDED AND SUPERCEEDED BY WORKSHEETS 1891X THRU 1899X; AND
ASSESSMENTS MMU-1891X THRU 1899X RESPECTIVELY.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-190
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.9
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
190
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
FAIL UNLATCHED
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU-191
MMU
191
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ p] [ P] [ p]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE :
RYe:
FAIL LATCHED SHORT
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-i09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-192
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
192
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PILOTS INCONVENIENCE, POOR FIT AND DIFFICULT TO OPERATE THE
CONTROLS FOR TRANSLATIONS OR ROTATIONS. THE DESIGN IS SUCH THAT,
THE SMALLEST PILOT CAN OPERATE A FULLY EXTENDED ARM.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-II0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-192A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
192
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PILOTS INCONVENIENCE, POOR FIT AND DIFFICULT TO OPERATE THE
CONTROLS FOR TRANSLATIONS OR ROTATIONS. THE DESIGN IS SUCH THAT,
THE SMALLEST PILOT CAN OPERATE A FULLY EXTENDED ARM.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-Ill
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-194
NASA FMEA #: 3.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
194
EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL CONNECTED
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-195
NASA FMEA #: 3.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
195
EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNN, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] IF]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3- [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE :
REMARKS:
FAIL DISCONNECTED
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-i13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-196
NASA FMEA #: 2.5.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 196
ITEM: PLSS LATCHES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RYe:
FAIL OPEN
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-196A
NASA FMEA #: 2.5.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 196
ITEM: PLSS LATCHES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[p]
[ ]
B
[ P ]
[ F ]
[N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
CN]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-115
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-197
NASA FMEA #: 2.5.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 197
ITEM: PLSS LATCHES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL CLOSED. ONLY ONE LATCH NEEDS TO OPERATE FOR PLSS RELEASE.
IF ALL LATCHES FAIL CLOSED, CREWMEMBER ENTERS AIRLOCK WITH MMU
ATTACHED AND SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS ARE IMPACTED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-198
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
198
MMU BATTERY LATCHES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] *
IX]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] C N ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL UNLATCHED. SEE MDAC MMU-1981 FOR ANALYSIS DURING
LAUNCH/LANDING. THE LATCH FAILURE ONORBIT (PRE-OPS, OPS, AND
POST-OPS) HAS NO MISSION IMPACT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-199
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
199
MMU BATTERY LATCHES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL LATCHED. FAILURE SHOULD BE "FAILS TO UNLATCH"
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-200
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 200
ITEM: BACKUP ARM LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL LATCHED
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-201
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 201
ITEM: BACKUP ARM LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL UNLATCHED. SCREENS ARE NOT REQUIRED WITH THIS CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-202
NASA FMEA #: 4.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 202
ITEM: QD THERMAL COVERS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-203
NASA FMEA #: 4.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
203
BATTERY THERMAL COVER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
FAIL OPEN DURING STOWAGE.
RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
SCREENS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-204
NASA FMEA #: 4.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
204
BATTERY THERMAL COVER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3/3 ] [ P ]
[P] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN DURING FLIGHT. SCREENS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE
RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-205
NASA FMEA #: 4.6.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
205
EXT. PWR. THERMAL COVER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[p] [p] IF]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN DURING FLIGHT. SCREENS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE
RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-206
NASA FMEA #: 5.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
206
BACKUP PLSS LATCHES (LAP BELTS)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN DURING FLIGHT
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-207
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
207
BACKUP PLSS LATCHES
LEAD ANALYST : DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).
[ 2/2 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL CLOSED
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-208
NASA FMEA #: 1.9.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 208
ITEM: GN2 LINES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAK. RUPTURE IS NOT A REALISTIC FAILURE FOR THESE LINES. AN
EXTERNAL LEAK IN THE FSS LINES MAY LIMIT THE CHARGE OR FAIL TO
CHARGE THE MMU TANKS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-210
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 210
ITEM: GN2 LINES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C p ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
FSS BLOCKED LINES HAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED BY A NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-211
NASA FMEA #: i. I0.I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 211
ITEM: PRESSURE GAUGE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FSS PRESSURE GAUGE LEAK WHILE CHARGING THE MMU TANKS WILL FORCE A
SWITCH TO THE REDUNDANT SYSTEM. LOSS OF REDUNANCY IS MISSION
FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-212
NASA FMEA #: 1.12.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 212
ITEM: VENT VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [' ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIFFICULT TO MATE FSS/MMU QD DUE TO HIGH PRESSURE LINE, CREW
INCONVENIENCE. IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, EXCEPT THAT THE SCREENS
DO NOT NEED TO BE SPECIFIED.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-130
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-213
NASA FMEA #: 1.12.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 213
ITEM: VENT VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [N] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-214
NASA FMEA #: 1.12.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 214
ITEM: VENT VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MMU-215
1.3.6
MMU
215
QD-HOSE END
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF RECHARGE CAPABILITY, LOSS OF MISSION IF REDUNDANT SYSTEM
FAILS. IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-216
NASA FMEA #: 1.3.3
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 216
ITEM: QD-HOSE END
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-217
NASA FMEA #: 1.3.2
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 217
ITEM: QD-FIXED HALF
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LEAK, FAILED OPEN
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-218
NASA FMEA #: 1.3.3
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 218
ITEM: QD-FIXED HALF
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MMU-219
2.6.2
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU
219
GAS ACTUATED NUTS (4)
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
R_:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-219A
NASA FMEA #: 2.6.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU
219
GAS ACTUATED NUTS (4)
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN. THIS FMEA WILL RESULT IN THE SAME EFFEDCT AS 2.6.2,
AND THEREFORE TREATED THE SAME WAY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-220
NASA FMEA #: 2.6.1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NNU
220
GAS ACTUATED NUTS (4)
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-221
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 221
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R 3 [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEAK. FSS FILTER LEAK HAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED BY A NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-140
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-222
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 222
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /2R ] C P ] C F ] [ P ] C A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FRACTURE. FSS FILTER FRACTURE HAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED BY A NASA
FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-223
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 223
ITEM: GAN HEATERS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN. THE ASTRONAUT, USING A SPECIAL TOOL STOWED ON THE FSS CAN
MANUALLY UNBOLT AND REBOLT ALL NUTS AND BOLTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-224
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
224
HEATER FOR FSS RECHARGE SYSTEM PNEUMATIC FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH THE FSS HEATER FAILED OFF, THE FILTER WILL BECOME EMBRITTLED
AND FRACTURE. DEBRIS MAY CAUSE OTHER MALFUNCTIONS DOWNSTREAM. A
SIMILAR FAILURE IN THE ALTERNATE SYSTEM WILL CAUSE MISSION
TERMINATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-225
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
225
TOGGLE VALVE HEATERS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
OPEN CIRCUIT, SHORT CIRCUIT
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
MMU-226
4.2.1
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU
226
PRESSURE GAUGE HEATERS
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
C
C ]
[p]
CN]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_-
FAIL OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT
] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-227
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 227
ITEM: QD HEATERS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OFF, OPEN CIRCUIT, SHORT CIRCUIT. FSS QD MAY BE INOPERABLE
OR FAIL CAUSING THE LOSS OF ONE RECHARGE SIDE. LOSS OF BOTH
SIDES IS LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-228
4.4.2
MMU
228
HEATER THERMOSTATS
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
CP] [P]
[P] CP]
C ] C ]
c
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN. MISSION IS TERMINATED WHEN FLIGHT CRITICAL COMPONENT
FAILS. MMU WILL NOT FLY WITHOUT A REDUNDANT SYSTEM AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-229
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.1
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 229
ITEM: HEATER THERMOSTATS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL CLOSED. MISSION IS TERMINATE WHEN FLIGHT CRITICAL COMPONENT
FAILS. MMU WILL NOT FLY WITHOUT A REDUNDANT SYSTEM AVAILABLE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-230
NASA FMEA #: 4.5.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
230
TOGGLE VALVE TEMP. SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF SIGNAL. THE FSS SUPPLY TOGGLE VALVE TEMPERATURE SENSOR
IS NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL. THIS FAILURE MODE DOES NOT REQUIRE
SCREENS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-231
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
231
TOGGLE VALVE TEMP. SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] CP]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL HIGH
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-232
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
232
TOGGLE VALVE TEMP. SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST : DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
FAIL LOW
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-233
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
233
ORBITER POWER CONNECTOR
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE ARE VOIDED. THIS IS COVERED WITH ITEM
MMU-184.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
MMU-234
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
234
EXTERNAL POWER LINE/CONNECTOR
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
OPEN CIRCUIT.
VOIDED.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THIS IOA IS SAME AS MMU-184, AND MAY THEREFORE BE
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-235
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
235
ORBITER ADAPTOR BEAM MOUNTS (6)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE RECOMMENDATION IS NOT TO CONSIDER THESE FAILURES SINCE THEY
ARE NOT WITHIN THE SPECIFICATION OF 22206. THIS ITEM IS PART OF
STRUCTURE, AND ITS FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE RELATIONSHIP ARE VERY
UNLIKELY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-237
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
237
BACKBEAM SHOCK MOUNTS (4)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE RECOMMENDATION IS NOT TO CONSIDER THESE FAILURES SINCE THEY
ARE NOT WITHIN THE SPECIFICATION OF NSTS-22206. THIS ITEM IS
PART OF STRUCTURE, AND ITS FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE RELATIONSHIP
ARE VERY UNLIKELY. THIS FAILURE MODE MAY BE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-238
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
238
FOOT RESTRAINT ADJUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ P] [ P] [ p] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
MMU-239
2.2.2
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU
239
FOOT RESTRAINT ADJUST
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
C ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
E ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
JAM LOCKED
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-240
NASA FMEA #: 2.7.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 240
ITEM: MMU LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] C ] [ ] C N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
JAM OPEN. LOSS OF FUNCTION (TO LATCH MMU TO FSS) COULD BE LOSS
OF MISSION, IF THE UNIT CANNOT BE RECHARGED. HOWEVER PRIOR TO
REENTRY, THE MMU CAN BE STRAPPED DOWN IN THE MIDDECK. IOA AGREES
WITH THE FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-241
NASA FMEA #: 2.7.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 241
ITEM: MMULATCH
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / i c 1 c ] c ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
JAM CLOSED. THE MISSION IS TERMINATED IF REDUNDANT LANYARD
ATTACHED TO THE FAILED LATCH DOES NOT BREAK THE SHEAR PIN.
AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
IOA
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-242
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 242
ITEM: MUSHROOM KNOBS (8)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ p] [ p] [ p]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
R_:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-243
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 243
ITEM: THERMAL BLANKETS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FSS THERMAL BLANKET FAILURE TO COVER SENSITIVE COMPONENT MAY
RESULT IN LOSS OF RECHARGE CAPABILITY THUS POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-161
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-244
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
244
TETHER REEL RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] C ]
CP] CP] CP]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FRACTURE. THIS MALFUNCTION IS VOIDED SINCE THE ITEM IS CONNECTED
TO THE EMU.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-245
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
245
TETHER REEL RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS MALFUNCTION IS VOIDED SINCE THE ITEM IS CONNECTED TO THE
EMU.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
MMU-1001X
I.I.i
MMU
I001
GN2 TANK
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
COXPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ ]
C ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
C
C
[
CIL
ITEM
] IX]*
] IX]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MMU-1031X
1.5.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
1031
TOGGLE VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-1051X
1.4.3
MMU
1051
ISOLATION VALVE
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-II41X
1.6.1
MMU
1141
THRUSTER TRIAD
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MMU-1191X BASELINE [ ]
1.2.6 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1191
ITEM: REGULATOR
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ N /N ]
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] IN] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HIGH PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM WILL FORCE THE VENT VALVE OPEN, THUS
LOSS OF GN2 OR LOSS OF SIDE. FUNCTIONAL LOSS MAY LEAVE THE CREW
PERSON STRANDED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE :
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
MMU-1211X
1.2.1
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU
1211
GN2 REGULATOR
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /ZR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA FULLY EXPLAINS THE CORRECTIVE ACTION, BUT ASSIGNED THE
CRITICALITY INAPPROPRIATELY. THE LOSS OF REGULATOR DOES NOT
CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE IMMEDIATELY. ISO VALVE WILL BE SHUTOFF TO
STOP THE LEAKAGE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-1212X
1.2.5
MMU
1212
GN2 REGULATOR
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ .]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE :
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT :
MMU-1251X
1.3.1
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU
1251
QUICK DISCONNECT
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA DID NOT CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE COUPLER ON QD IS SELF
SEALING WHICH STOPS LEAKAGE UNDER SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE. ALSO,
RECHARGE ACTIVITY IS ACCOMPLISHED DURING POST-OPS NOT PREP AS
INDICATED BY THE FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MMU-1252X BASELINE [ ]
1.3.4 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1252
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ / ]
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA, EXCEPT THAT RECHARGE IS DONE
DURING POST-OPS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-1253X
1.3.5
MMU
1253
QUICK DISCONNECT
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU-1281X
3.11.2
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU
1281
BATTERY
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] CP]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA DOES NOT RECOGNIZE REPLACING THE AFFECTED BATTERY WITH
ANOTHER ONE STORED IN ORBITER.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU-1681X
3.3.5
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ IN ]
MMU
1681
GYRO POWER SUPPLY
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF GYRO RESULTS IN LOSS OF AAH & ALT CONTROL SWITCH
CAPABILITY NEEDED FOR CERTAIN MISSIONS LIKE SOLAR MAX. MANUAL
RHC CONTROL IS AVAILABLE AS A BACK-UP TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1701X
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
1701
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
C P ] [ P ] [ ]
C P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERS THE AXES REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER.
[ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
MMU-1702X
3.2.4
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
1702
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERS THE AXES REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1703X
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
1703
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [p]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERS THE AXES REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1704X
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
1704
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAILS OFF IN ALL THREE AXIS. SEE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-172 iX
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
1721
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
C2/2 ] [ ] [ ]
[3/IR] C P ] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL OFF ONE AXIS. SEE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 1721.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1722X
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
1722
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL ° RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ROTATION IN ONE AXIS. THE PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE
IN OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT
STRANDED IF UNABLE TO SIGHT THE ORBITER.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1723X
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
1723
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
CP]
CN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL OFF (1-3 AXES), SEE ALSO MMU-1721A.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1724X
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
1724
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ]
COSPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] C N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ X] *
] [X]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SEE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 1722.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1731X
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
1731
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA C 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ x ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MECHANICALLY JAMS IN ISO MODE. IF THE FAILURE IS MECHANICAL,
BOTH ISO VALVES ARE CLOSED. THE HANDLE CANNOT BE RETURNED TO
NORMAL POSITION. PILOT IS STRANDED WITH NO PROPULSIVE POWER.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
MMU-1861X
4.3.2
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU
1861
CEA THERMOSTATS (2 SETS)
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAILS CLOSE
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 4/14/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1862X
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.1
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1862
ITEM: MMU THERMOSTATS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
FAILS OPEN
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU-1891X
2.1.1
MMU
1891
ARM ANGLE ADJUST
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C ] C ]
[P] C P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE ARM JAMS IN THE WORK POSITION, THE PILOT CAN FLY BACK
SINCE IT MUST BE SHORTENED BEFORE IT IS PLACED IN THAT POSITION.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1892X
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1892
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE ARM JAMS IN THE WORK POSITION, THE PILOT CAN FLY BACK
SINCE IT MUST BE SHORTENED BEFORE IT IS PLACED IN THAT POSITION.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1893X
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1893
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] C ] C ] C
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C N /N ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE ARM FAILS TO LOCK BACK TO FLIGHT POSITION, THE PILOT CAN
OPERATE THE MMU FROM THE WORK POSITION SINCE THE ARM MUST BE
SHORTENED BEFORE IT IS PLACED IN THE WORK POSITION.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1894X
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1894
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE ARM FAILS TO LOCK BACK TO FLIGHT POSITION, THE PILOT CAN
OPERATE THE MMU FROM THE WORK POSITION SINCE THE ARM MUST BE
SHORTENED BEFORE IT IS PLACED IN THE WORK POSITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1895X
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1895
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [
[ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE ARM FAILS TO LOCK BACK TO FLIGHT POSITION, THE PILOT CAN
OPERATE THE MMU FROM THE WORK POSITION SINCE THE ARM MUST BE
SHORTENED BEFORE IT IS PLACED IN THE WORK POSITION.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1896X
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1896
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (I f different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILkRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE IS, "INADVERTENTLY UNLOCKS". HOWEVER, THE ARM IS
ALSO SECURED WITH A STRAP.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
_DW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMP_ [ / ]
MMU-1897X
2.1.I0
MMU
1897
ARM ANGLE ADJUST
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CI_ RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE ARM JAMS IN THE WORK POSITION, THE PILOT CAN FLY BACK
SINCE IT MUST BE SHORTENED BEFORE IT IS PLACED IN THAT POSITION.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1898X
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1898
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF THE ARM JAMS IN THE WORK POSITION, THE PILOT CAN FLY BACK
SINCE IT MUST BE SHORTENED BEFORE IT IS PLACED IN THAT POSITION.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/19/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-1899X
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1899
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 IIR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAILS FROM WORK TO LAUNCH POSITION.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/24/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU-1981X
2.3.1
MMU
1981
MMU BATTERY LATCHES
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MMU-2111X
1.10.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
2111
FSS PRESSURE GAUGES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MMU-2141X BASELINE [ ]
1.13.1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2141
ITEM: FSS SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ]
IOA [ /NA ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THIS FAILURE MODE, SINCE THE ITEM STUDIED
IS THE FSS SUPPLY VALVE AND THE FAILURE MODE IS FOR THE SUPPLY
VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER. THIS IS NOT CONSISTENT - IT ASSUMES A
FAILURE IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. MMU SUPPLY VALVE CB IS STUDIED
UNDER ARPCS-230 TO BE 3/2R (P,P,P).
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MMU-2142X
1.13.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
2142
FSS SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA, BUT RECOGNIZES THAT RECHARGING
IS DONE DURING POST-OPS.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
MMU-2143X
1.13.3
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU
2143
FSS SUPPLY VALVE
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [p] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
C ] [ ] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IF A SEVERE LEAKAGE OCCURS THAT CANNOT BE STOPPED BY THE VALVE
ITSELF, THEN GN2 FROM ORBITER AND MMU WILL ESCAPE OUTSIDE.
RECHARGE CAPABILITY WILL BE LOST FOR THAT MMU. ONLY ONE MMU
REMAINING TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION, AND THAT IS REAL TIME CALL
DEPENDENT UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCE.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-200
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-2144X
1.13.4
MMU
2144
FSS SUPPLY VALVE
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] C ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-201
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE :
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
MMU-218 IX BASELINE [ ]
I.ii.I NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2181
ITEM: FLEX HOSE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ / ]
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA, EXCEPT THAT RECHARGING IS
UNDERSTOOD TO BE DONE DURING POST-OPS PERIOD.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-202
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/27/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-2391X
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2391
ITEM: FOOT RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICALITY FOR IOA IS PRELIMINARY. FINAL ANALYSIS IS RESERVED
UNTIL MODIFICATION TO THE RESTRAINT IS AVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-203
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MMU-2392X
2.2.3
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
2392
FSS FOOT RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-204
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU-4000X
MMU
4000
ARM STRAP
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] C
* CIL ° RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-205
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: MMU-4001X
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4001
ITEM: ARM STRAPS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
TWO LATCHES AND THIS HINGE HAVE TO FAIL FOR THE ARM TO BECOME A
PROJECTILE IN THIS PAYLOAD BAY.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-206
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU-4002X
5.2.1
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU
4002
MMU BATTERY RECHARGE CABLE
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY OF BATTERY EXPLOSION FOR WHICH
THE IOA ANALYSIS DISAGREED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU-4003X
5.2.1
MMU
4003
MMU BATTERY RECHARGE CABLE
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SEE MMU-4002 REMARKS.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
MMU-4004X
5.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
4004
TRUNNION PIN ATTACHMENT DEVICE
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3 12R ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [P] [P] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE FMEA ASSUMES THAT EQUIPMENT TO BE ATTACHED ARE NEEDED FOR
RESCUE (LIFE SAVING) OPERATION. THIS ALREADY ASSUMES A
CONTINGENCY SCENARIO AND THEREFORE MULTIPLE FAILURE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU-4005X
5.5.1
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU
4005
BATTERY TRANSFER BAG
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ADDITIONAL BATTERIES EXIST TO REPLACE THE LOST ONE, AND ALSO HAS
A TETHER ATTACHED - SEE FMEA 5.6.1 (MMU-4006).
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU-4006X
5.6.1
MMU
4006
BATTERY TETHER STRAP
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAI!DI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[ P ] [P]
C ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED BACK-UP BATTERIES TO REPLACE THE LOST ONE. ALSO,
THE FAILED TETHER CAN BE REPLACED WITH ANOTHER ONE (OTHER MMU).
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-211
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COHPARE [ i ]
MMU-4007X
5.7.1
MMU
4007
CONTINGENCY TOOL
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-212
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MMU-4008X
5.7.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MMU
4008
CONTINGENCY TOOL
LEAD ANALYST : DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-213
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-4009X
5.8.1
MMU
4009
5/16" THIN WALL SOCKET
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-214
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-4010X
5.8.2
MMU
4010
5/16" THIN WALL SOCKET
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-215
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
MMU-4011X
5.9.1
MMU
4011
SUBWAY STRAPS
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-216
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MMU-4012X
5.10.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MMU
4012
THRUSTER CUE LIGHT EXTENDER
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [ ] [ ]
IN] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-217
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
MMU-4013X
5.11.1
MMU
4013
CAMERA BRACKET
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-218
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MMU-4014X
4.7.1
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4014
ITEM: SUNSHIELD
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE WAS CONSIDERED NOT APPLICABLE DUE TO: 1)THE
COMPONENT IS CONSIDERED IN THE SAME FASHION AS THE ORBITER SKIN_
AND THEREFORE NOT CONSIDERED, 2)THE CAUSE OF FAILURE IS NOT
REALISTIC, 3)THE ONLY POSSIBILITY FOR FAILURE MAY BE THROUGH
VIBRATION AND SHOCK. HOWEVER THIS CAN ONLY OCCUR DURING LIFTOFF
AND THE FSS ISOLATE THE SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-219
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MMU-4015X
4.2.2
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ /NA ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MMU
4015
HEATERS
DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [
[ ] [ ] [
[ N ] [ N ] [
] IX]*
] [ ]
] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THIS FAILURE MODE SINCE IT IS NOT
CREDIBLE.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-220
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
1.1.2 i00
1.5.3 102
1.5.2 103
1.4.1 104
1.4.2 105
1.7.3 106
1.7.4 106
1.7.1 106
1.7.2 106
Ii0
iii
1.6.2 112
1.6.4 113
1.6.3 114
1.2.4 i16
1.2.3 i17
1.2.6 119
1.2.2 120
121
1.8.1 122
127
3.11.1 128
129
3.14.3 130
3.14.4 130
3.14.1 131
132
133
3.13.1 134
3.13.2 134
3.13.4 135
3.9.1 136
3.8.1 138
3.7.1 142
3.12.5 152
3.12.6 152
3.12.1 154
3.12.2 154
158
3.3.1 159
3.3.3 160
GN2 TANK
TOGGLE VALVE
TOGGLE VALVE
ISOLATION VALVE
ISOLATION VALVE
GN2 LINES (ISOL VLV - REG
GN2 LINES (REG-THRUSTERS)
GN2 LINES (XFEED VLV - XF
GN2 LINES (TANK-ISOL VLV)
THRUSTER MANIFOLD
THRUSTER MANIFOLD
THRUSTER
THRUSTER
THRUSTER
GN2 REGULATOR
GN2 REGULATOR
GN2 REGULATOR
GN2 RELIEF VALVE
GN2 RELIEF VALVE
PRESSURE GAGE
GN2 TEST PORT
BATTERY
INT/EXT POWER SWITCH
INT/EXT POWER SWITCH
INT/EXT POWER SWITCH
INT/EXT POWER SWITCH
TERMINAL BOARD
TERMINAL BOARD
MAIN POWER SWITCH
MAIN POWER SWITCH
MAIN POWER SWITCH
LTS/HTR. cb
CEA CIRCUIT BREAKER
VDA cb
CEA POWER SWITCH
CEA POWER SWITCH
CEA POWER SWITCH
CEA POWER SWITCH
CEA
CEA
CEA
LEAK
FAIL OPEN
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL OPEN
FAIL CLOSE
LEAK
LEAK
LEAK
LEAK
LEAK
CONSTRICTION
FAIL OPEN
FAIL CLOSED
LEAK
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL OPEN
FAIL LOW
FAIL OPEN
FAIL CLOSED
LEAK
LEAK
NO OUTPUT-LOW OUTPUT
FAIL OPEN
FAIL TO INTERNAL
POSITION
FAIL TO INTERNAL
POSITION
FAIL TO EXTERNAL
POSITION
SHORT
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OFF
FAIL OFF
FAIL ON
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL ON IN ISO.
FAIL ON IN ISO.
FAIL OFF
FAIL OFF
FAIL ON 1-12 CH.
FAIL OFF 1-12 CH.
NOISY OUTPUT
D-2
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
3.3.3 161
162
163
164
3.3.2 166
167
3.2.1 169
3.2.2 169
3.1.1 171
3.1.2 171
3.2.7 173
3.2.9 174
3.2. I0 174
3.3.1 182
3.4.1 183
3.5.1 184
4.1.1 185
4.2.1 185
2.1.9 190
191
2.1.7 192
2.1.8 192
3.6.1 194
3.6.2 195
2.5.1 196
2.5.3 196
2.3.2 199
2OO
201
4.6.1 203
5.4.1 206
207
2.6.1 220
222
4.2.1 224
4.4.2 228
4.4.1 229
1.1.1 i001
1.5.1 1031
1.4.3 1051
1.6.1 1141
3.2.6 1704
i. 2.6 1191
1.2.1 1211
1.2.5 1212
3.1.6 1724
3.2.8 1731
4.3.2 1861
CEA
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
ISOLATION VALVE TIMER
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER
THC
THC
RHC
RHC
THC ISOLATE SWITCH
THC ISOLATE SWITCH
THC ISOLATE SWITCH
CEA PWR SPLY
WIRE HARNESS
EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
HEATERS
HEATERS
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
ARM LENGTH ADJUST
EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR
PLSS LATCHES
PLSS LATCHES
MMU BATTERY LATCHES
BACKUP ARM LATCH
BACKUP ARM LATCH
BATTERY THERMAL COVER
BACKUP PLSS LATCHES (LAP
BACKUP PLSS LATCHES
GAS ACTUATED NUTS (4)
F I LTER
HEATER FOR FSS RECHARGE S
HEATER THERMOSTATS
HEATER THERMOSTATS
GN2 TANK
TOGGLE VALVES
ISOLATION VALVE
THRUSTER TRIAD
THC
REGULATOR
GN2 REGULATOR
GN2 REGULATOR
RHC
THC
CEA THERMOSTATS (2 SETS)
LOGIC FAILURE
FAIL OFF
TOO SHORT
FAILS ON
FAIL OFF
FAIL ON
FAIL ON 1-3 AXES
FAIL ON 1-3 AXES
FAIL ON (1-3 AXES)
FAIL ON (1-3 AXES)
FAIL ON
FAIL OFF
FAIL OFF
FAIL HIGH OR LOW
SHORT OR OPEN CIRCUIT
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OFF
FAIL OFF
FAIL UNLATCHED
FAIL LATCHED SHORT
FAIL LATCHED LONG
FAIL LATCHED LONG
FAIL CONNECTED
FAIL DISCONNECTED
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL LATCHED
FAIL LATCHED
FAIL UNLATCHED
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL CLOSED
FAIL CLOSED
FRACTURE
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL CLOSED
RUPTURE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
SHORT IN SOLENOID
FAILS OFF
OUT OF TOLERANCE
PISTON JAMMED
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAIL OFF THREE AXES
MECHANICALLY JAMS
FAILED CLOSED
D-3
NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
4.3.1 1862
2.1.6 1896
1899
2.3.1 1981
1.13.3 2143
5.7.1 4007
MMU THERMOSTATS
ARM ANGLE ADJUST
ARM ANGLE ADJUST
MMU BATTERY LATCHES
FSS SUPPLY VALVE
CONTINGENCY TOOL
FAILS OFF
INADVERTENTLY UNLOCKS
FAILS FROM WORK
LATCH FAILS OPEN
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
FAILS TO RELEASE FLEX
D-4
APPENDIX E
DET_TLED ANALYB'r B
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
09, Analysis of the Manned Maneuvering Unit, (21 November 1986).
Prior results were obtained independently and documented before
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis
was performed to address failure modes not previously considered
by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being
analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in _$T$ 22_06, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, I0 october 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: I001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/Ft_C
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 TANK
RUPTURE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2 ) PROPULSION SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 1/1
OPS : 1/1
POST-OPS : i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: FATIGUE, MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE FROM SHARPNEL AND/OR IMPULSIVE
DELTA V.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT :
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TOGGLE VALVES
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2 ) PROPULSION SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 2/2
OPS : 2/IR
POST-OPS : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: SEAL (O-RING) FAILURE, SEAT GALLED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GN2 ON THE SIDE WITH LEAK. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON
BY STRANDING IF OTHER SIDE ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1051
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
ISOLATION VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2 ) PROPULSION SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
C [ P ]
CAUSES: SEAL (O-RING) FAILURE/DAMAGE, SEAT GALLED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GN2 FROM THE SIDE WITH LEAKING VALVE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWMEMBER BY STRANDING IF OTHER GN2 SIDE FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER TRIAD
SHORT IN SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/1R
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CHAFFING FROM VIBRATION, INSULATION
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIDE DUE TO CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPPING OR EXCESSIVE BATTERY
DRAIN. POSSIBLE STRANDING OF THE CREW PERSON IF OTHER SIDE ALSO
FAILS DURING EVA OPS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR
OUT OF TOLERANCE (HIGH)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM
3) A OR B SIDE
4) REGULATOR
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: A OR B SIDE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SPRING FAILURE, INCORRECT CALIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH, RELIEF VALVE OPENS,
LOSS OF SIDE RESULTS. AT PRESSURES BELOW RELIEF OPENING, NO
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT. LOSS OF BOTH SIDES STRANDS CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 REGULATOR
PISTON JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2 ) PROPULSION SYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 2/IR
POST=OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A POSIBILITY EXISTS TO HAVE THE PISTON JAMMED IN SUCH A MANNER
WHICH MAY FAIL THE REGULATOR IN OPEN AND THE VENT PORT IN CLOSED
POSITION. IN THIS CASE, THE HIGH PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM MAY DAMAGE
THE THRUSTERS MANIFOLD AND LOOSE ATTITUDE CONTROL. THE
AFFECTED SIDE MUST BE ISOLATED THROUGH ISOLATION VALVE, CANCEL
MMU ACTIVITY AND RETURN TO ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1212
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GN2 REGULATOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SIDE A OR B
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SIDE REQUIRING IT BE ISOLATED. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON STRANDING IF OTHER SIDE FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1251
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2 ) PROPULSION
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE QD COMING OFF PREMATURELY DURING RECHARGE POSES NO IMMEDIATE
PROBLEM SINCE IT HAS SELF-SEALING CAPABILITY. NO RECHARGE
CAPABILITY AT WORST CASE WILL CANCEL MMU ACTIVITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1252
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT
FAILURE MODE: INABILITY TO MATE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) PROPULSION
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: /NA
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF RECHARGE CAPABILITY FROM ONE PORT. TOTAL LOSS OF
RECHARGE CAPABILITY WILL CANCEL SUBSEQUENT MMU ACTIVITY THUS
MISSION LOSS WITH MULTIPLE MMU OPS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1253
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
QUICK DISCONNECT
INABILITY TO DEMATE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) PROPULSION
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 3/3
OPS : /NA
POST-OPS : 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HOSE MUST BE CUT BY EMERGENCY TOOL TO REMOVE FLEX HOSE FROM
QD. THIS WILL HOWEVER NEGATE RECHARGE CAPABILITY FOR SUBSEQUENT
MMU OPS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-11
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1281
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY
INABILITY TO MATE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
S)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/2R
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL (PIN BENT), CORROSION/CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE AFFECTED BATTERY NEEDS TO BE CHANGED WITH A GOOD ONE FROM
ORBITER AND RESUME MMU ACTIVITIES. IF NO BATTERY EXISTS, THEN
MMUACTIVITY CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED - MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1681
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM: GYRO POWER SUPPLY
FAILURE MODE: UNCOMMANDED OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2 ) ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNCOMMANDED RATES PROVIDED TO MMU PROPULSION. REQUIRES REMOVAL
OF POWER TO POWER SUPPLY AND LOSS OF AAH. SOME MISSION (LIKE
SOLAR MAX) MAY REQUIRE AAH AND ALT CONTROL SWITCH TO SUCCESSFULLY
ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION GOAL. LOSS OF AUTO CONTROL, WILL LEAVE
MANUAL ATTITUDE CONTROL THROUGH RHC.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MMU
1701 FLIGHT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
-)
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAILS OFF ELECTRICALLY IN ONE AXIS (+, -, OR + AND
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) THC SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/IR
POST-OPS: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT TRANSLATE IN ONE AXIS, IN ONE DIRECTION OR BOTH. THE
PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE ON OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL
FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT STRANDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MMU
1702 FLIGHT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
-)
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAILS OFF MECHANICALLY IN ONE AXIS (+, -, OR + AND
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2 ) THC SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/1R
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: LOSSEMAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT TRANSLATE IN ONE AXIS, IN ONE DIRECTION OR BOTH. THE
PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE ON OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL
FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT STRANDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MMU
1703 FLIGHT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MAGNET
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAILS OFF IN ONE AXIS (+, -, OR + AND -)-DETACHED
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) THC SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/1R
POST-OPS: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CANNOT TRANSLATE IN ONE AXIS, IN ONE DIRECTION OR BOTH. THE
PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE ON OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL
FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT STRANDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/16/87
1704
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAILS OFF IN ALL THREE AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2 ) THC SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 2/2
OPS : 2/1R
POST-OPS : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING, PIECE PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THC FAILS ON ALL THREE AXES, PILOT CANNOT TRANSLATE. THIS
FAILURE CAN BE WORKED AROUND USING THE SATELLITE STABILIZATION
FUNCTION AND THE ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER YAW COMMANDS WHICH
WILL RESULT IN TRANSLATION ALONG THE Y AXIS. WE CONSIDER THIS AN
UNLIKE REDUNDANT SYSTEM FOR TRANSLATION. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS
WILL RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF PILOT/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/16/87
MMU
1721
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAILS OFF ELECTRICALLY ONE AXIS
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2 ) RHC SYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/IR
POST-OPS: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ROTATION IN ONE AXIS. THE PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE
IN OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT
STRANDED IF UNABLE TO SIGHT THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-18
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/19/86
1722
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAIL OFF MECHANICALLY IN ONE AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) RHC SYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/1R
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ROTATION IN ONE AXIS. THE PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE
IN OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT
STRANDED IF UNABLE TO SIGHT ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/19/86
1723
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAIL OFF (1-3 AXES)-DETACHED MAGNET
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) RHC SYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 3/IR
POST-OPS: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ROTATION IN ONE AXIS. THE PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE
IN OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT
STRANDED IF UNABLE TO SIGHT ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/16/8_
MMU
1724
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
FAIL OFF THREE AXES
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2) RHC SYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 2/2
OPS : i/1
POST-OPS : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] BC ] cc ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING,
CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ROTATIONAL CONTROL. THE PILOT IS STRANDED IF UNABLE TO SIGHT
THE ORBITER. THIS CRITICALITY CAN BE DOWNGRADED TO A 2/IR IF IT
PROVES FEASIBLE FOR THE PILOT TO PUT A HAND ON ONE OF THE
PROPULSIVE NOZZLES WHILE FIRING TRANSLATION TO FORCE A ROTATIONAL
MOTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/16/87
MMU
1731
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER
MECHANICALLY JAMS IN ISO MODE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2 ) THC SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 2/2
OPS : 1/1
POST-OPS : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ISOLATION VALVES ARE CLOSED.
PILOT IS STRANDED.
LOSS OF ALL PROPULSIVE CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1861
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CEA THERMOSTATS (2 SETS)
FAILED CLOSED (HEATERS ON CONTINUOUSLY)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MMU
2) CEA
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/1R
POST-OPS: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL MAINTAIN THE CONTROL ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY
HEATERS ON CONTINUOUSLY. LOSS OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT IN THE CEA
SUCH AS THE VALVE DRIVE AMPLIFIERS WILL FOLLOW, FORCING THE
SHUTDOWN OF ONE SIDE. FUNCTION FAILURE MAY LEAVE PILOT STRANDED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1862
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MMU THERMOSTATS
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MMU
2) CEA
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: /NA
OPS: 2/1R
POST-OPS: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HEATER WITH THE FAILED THERMOSTAT WILL NOT OPERATE. POSSIBLE
COMPONENT FAILURE IF TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS LOWER LIMITS. IF FLIGHT
CRITICAL COMPONENT, POSSIBLE STRANDING/LOSS OF CREWMEMBER IF
OTHER SIDE ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1891 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
FAILURE MODE: UNABLE TO MOVE FROM WORK TO FLIGHT POSITION-LEFT
ARM
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2 ) MECHANICAL
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT OR RIGHT MMU ARM
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FAILURE OCCURS PRE-OPS, LATCH BOLTS CAN BE REMOVED AND ARM
PLACED IN FLIGHT POSITION WITH PIP PINS. HOWEVER, THIS
CORRECTIVE ACTION FREEZES THE ARM IN FLIGHT POSITION AND MAY
PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. DURING THE OPS PHASE THIS
FAILURE MAY PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. POST-OPS THE ARM
CAN BE LEFT IN THE FLIGHT POSITION AND CAN BE SECURED FOR
LANDING WITH PIP PINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1892
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM ANGLE ADJUST
UNABLE TO MOVE SYSTEM WORK TO FLIGHT-RIGHT ARM
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2 ) MECHANICAL
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT OR RIGHT MMU ARM
c[p]
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FAILURE OCCURS PRE-OPS, LATCH BOLTS CAN BE REMOVED AND ARM
PLACED IN FLIGHT POSITION WITH PIP PINS. HOWEVER, THIS
CORRECTIVE ACTION FREEZES THE ARM IN FLIGHT POSITION AND MAY
PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. DURING THE OPS PHASE THIS
FAILURE MAY PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. POST-OPS THE ARM
CAN BE LEFT IN THE FLIGHT POSITION AND CAN BE SECURED FOR
LANDING WITH PIP PINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1893 FLIGHT: 3/3
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
FAILURE MODE: LEFT ARM FAILS TO LOCK, INADVERTENTLY UNLOCKS, ANY
SINGLE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2 ) MECHANICAL
3 ) i_ ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT MMU ARM
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FAILURE OCCURS PRE-OPS, CREW INCONVENIENCE, ARM MAY HAVE TO BE
PINNED IN POSITION. IF FAILURE OCCURS DURING OPERATIONS (I.E.,
AFTER SATELLITE SERVICING) AND ARM FAILS TO LOCK BACK IN FLIGHT
POSITION, NO IMPACT. CREW INCONVENIENCE TO TRAVEL WITH
UNLOCKED ARM. POST-OPS, WHILE PREPPING TO RETURN, THE ARM CAN BE
STRAPPED OR LOCKED IN A DIFFERENT POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1894 FLIGHT: 3/3
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
FAILURE MODE: RIGHT ARM FAILS TO LOCK, INADVERTENTLY UNLOCKS,
ANY SINGLE POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2 ) MECHANICAL
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 3/3
OPS : 3/3
POST-OPS : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RIGHT MMU ARM
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FAILURE OCCURS PRE-OPS, CREW INCONVENIENCE, ARM MAY HAVE TO BE
PINNED IN POSITION. IF FAILURE OCCURS DURING OPERATIONS (I.E.,
AFTER SATELLITE SERVICING) AND ARM FAILS TO LOCK BACK IN FLIGHT
POSITION, NO IMPACT. CREW INCONVENIENCE TO TRAVEL WITH
UNLOCKED ARM. POST-OPS, WHILE PREPPING TO RETURN, THE ARM CAN BE
STRAPPED OR LOCKED IN A DIFFERENT POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1895
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POSITION
ARM ANGLEADJUST
FAILS TO LOCK, INADVERTENTLY UNLOCKS, ANY SINGLE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2 ) MECHANICAL
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST'OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT OR RIGHT MMU ARM
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FAILURE OCCURS PRE-OPS, CREW INCONVENIENCE, ARM MAY HAVE TO BE
PINNED IN POSITION. IF FAILURE OCCURS DURING OPERATIONS (I.E.,
AFTER SATELLITE SERVICING) AND ARM FAILS TO LOCK BACK IN FLIGHT
POSITION, NO IMPACT. CREW INCONVENIENCE TO TRAVEL WITH
UNLOCKED ARM. POST-OPS, WHILE PREPPING TO RETURN, THE ARM CAN BE
STRAPPED OR LOCKED IN A DIFFERENT POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1896 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENTLY UNLOCKS (LAUNCH, LANDING), FAILS TO
STAY IN LAUNCH POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) MECHANICAL
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: /*
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: LEFT OR RIGHT MMU ARM
PART NUMBER:
c[p]
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
*SEE MDAC ID-1891
THE ARMS HAVE LOCKS PLUS STRAPS TO KEEP THEM IN POSITION DURING
LAUNCH OR LANDING. SHOULD ALL REDUNDANCIES FAIL, THIS MMU
MISSION MAY BE LOST DUE TO AN INOPERABLE ARM.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1897
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM ANGLE ADJUST
UNABLE TO MOVE FROM LAUNCH TO WORK/FLIGHT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) MECHANICAL
3) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT OR RIGHT MMU ARM
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FAILURE OCCURS PRE-OPS, LATCH BOLTS CAN BE REMOVED AND ARM
PLACED IN FLIGHT POSITION WITH PIP PINS. HOWEVER, THIS
CORRECTIVE ACTION FREEZES THE ARM IN FLIGHT POSITION AND MAY
PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. DURING THE OPS PHASE THIS
FAILURE MAY
PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. POST-OPS THE ARM CAN BE LEFT
IN THE FLIGHT POSITION AND CAN BE SECURED FOR LANDING WITH PIP
PINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1898 FLIGHT: 3/2R
ITEM: ARM ANGLE ADJUST
FAILURE MODE: UNABLE TO RELEASE ARM FROM FLIGHT TO LAUNCH/WORK
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MMU
2 ) MECHANICAL
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT OR RIGHT MMU ARM
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF FAILURE OCCURS PRE-OPS, LATCH BOLTS CAN BE REMOVED AND ARM
PLACED IN FLIGHT POSITION WITH PIP PINS. HOWEVER, THIS
CORRECTIVE ACTION FREEZES THE ARM IN FLIGHT POSITION AND MAY
PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. DURING THE OPS PHASE THIS
FAILURE MAY
PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. POST-OPS THE ARM CAN BE LEFT
IN THE FLIGHT POSITION AND CAN BE SECURED FOR LANDING WITH PIP
PINS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1899
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM ANGLE ADJUST
FAILS FROM WORK TO LAUNCH POSITION
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) MMU
2 ) MECHANICAL
3 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: 2/IR
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRE-OPS, PILOT WILL NOT PROCEED WITH THE MISSION IF PROBLEM
CANNOT BE CORRECTED. DURING OPERATIONS, THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY
IS BASED ON THE PILOTS ABILITY TO TETHER HIMSELF TO THE MMU, DOFF
TO CORRECT THE ARM POSITION BACK TO FLIGHT AND DONNING IT FOR
THE FLIGHT BACK. FAILURE TO CORRECT THIS CONDITION AND DONN THE
MMU AGAIN MAY RESULT IN CREWMAN BEING STRANDED AWAY FROM THE
ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 1981
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MMU BATTERY LATCHES
LATCH FAILS OPEN-LAUNCH AND LANDING
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2 ) BATTERY
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: /*
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
*SEE ANALYSIS MDAC ID-198.
DURING LIFTOFF, IF THE LATCH FAILS OPEN, THE VELCRO THERMAL COVER
WILL HOLD THE LATCH FROM TRAVELING. THIS WILL KEEP THE BATTERY
IN PLACE. THE MOMENT ARM BETWEEN THE BATTERY PIN AND THE LATCH
HINGE POINT IS SMALL COMPARED TO THE MOMENT ARM BETWEEN THE
END OF THE LATCH (AGAINST THE VELCRO COVER) AND THE SAME LATCH
HINGE POINT. SHOULD THE SYSTEM FAIL, THE BATTERY MAY BECOME
UNHINGED, CAUSING LOSS OF BATTERY AND HINGES, THUS LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FSS PRESSURE GAUGES
ERRONEOUS-HIGH OR LOW
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FSS
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANISM BINDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT DUE TO NO IMPACT ON THE SYSTEMS (MMU OR FSS).
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FSS SUPPLY VALVE
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : /NA
OPS : /
POST-OPS : /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE MODE WAS STUDIED UNDER THE ARPCS (ARPCS-230) WHICH
WILL AFFECT MMU RECHARGE CAPABILITY DURING PRE/POST OPS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FSS SUPPLY VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2) FSS
3 ) PROPULSION
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT UNTIL RECHARGE IS ATTEMPTED AFTER
THE FIRST MMU-OPS. LOSS OF RECHARGE CAPABILITY WILL CANCEL
SUBSEQUENT MMU-OPS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2143
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FSS SUPPLY VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MMU
2) FSS
3 ) PROPULSION
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 2/2
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SEVERE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (IF NOT ABLE TO BE ISOLATED BY THE
VALVE-DOWNSTREAM SIDE) WILL PREVENT THE MMU FROM BEING RECHARGED
- GAS (GN2) WILL ESCAPE FROM ORBITER AND MMU TANKS. THUS MMU-OPS
WILL BE LOST AFTER THE FIRST MMU ACTIVITY. ONLY ONE MMU
REMAINING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-38
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FSS SUPPLY VALVE
FAILED OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) MMU
2) FSS
3 ) PROPULSION
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT IS RECOGNIZED, SINCE THE ORBITER MMU SUPPLY
VALVES AND MMU CROSSFED VALVES MAY BE USED TO ISOLATE THE LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2181
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLEX HOSE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE DUE TO THERMAL CYCLING OR STRESSED IN
EXCESS OF ALLOWABLE BEND RADIUS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GN2 TO SPACE. PROBABLE INEFFICIENT AND UNACCEPTABLE
CHANGE TO MMU. MISSION IMPACT IF REDUNDANT FSS CHARGE CAPABILITY
ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/27/87
NNU
2391
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FOOT RESTRAINT
BOOT JAMS IN FOOT RESTRAINT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) FSS
2) MECHANICAL
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOOT RESTRAINT IS BEING MODIFIED SUCH THAT THE HEEL CLIP CAN COME
OFF IF THE FOOT JAMS INSIDE. FINAL ANALYSIS SHOULD BE RESERVED
UNTIL MODIFICATION IS AVAILABLE TO IOA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 2392
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FSS FOOT RESTRAINT
INABILITY TO CAPTURE BOOT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) FSS
2) FOOT RESTRAINT
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FSS, RIGHT OR LEFT RESTRAINT
CAUSES: WEAR, DAMAGE TO BOOT OR FOOT RESTRAINT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF BOTH RESTRAINTS FAIL, GREATER EFFORT IN HOLDING POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23/87
HMU
4000
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM STRAP
FAILS LATCHED
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) ARM ASSEMBLY
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STRAP CAN BE FORCEFULLY UNLATCHED OR IT CAN BE CUT. THE PRIMARY
LATCH CAN BEAR ENTRY LOADS, OR ARM CAN BE PINNED IN THE FLIGHT
POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/23/87
4001
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ARM STRAPS
FAILS UNLATCHED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2 ) ARM ASSEMBLY
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: /*
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] c [
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
*SEE MDAC-201.
THIS PRIMARY LATCH HOLDS THE ARM IN PLACE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MMU BATTERY RECHARGE CABLE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE A RECHARGE INTERFACE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) FSS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER AIRLOCK
CAUSES: MECHANICAL FAILURE, ELECTRICAL OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INTERFACE PREVENTS RECHARGE OF BATTERY AND RESULTS IN A
MISSION IMPACT IF OTHER BATTERIES AND RECHARGING FUNCTIONS ARE
FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MMU BATTERY RECHARGE CABLE
FAILURE TO PROVIDE A RECHARGE INTERFACE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MMU
2) FSS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER AIRLOCK
CAUSES: SHORT DUE TO CONTAMINATION, FRAYED CONNECTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW FROM ORBITER WHICH WILL LIKELY RESULT IN
AIRLOCK RPC AUTOMATICALLY OPENING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRUNNION PIN ATTACHMENT DEVICE
FAILS TO PROVIDE ATTACHMENT
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) FSS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: 3/2R
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE, MISALIGNMENT (BENT)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ATTACH MISSION SPECIFIC AUXILI2%RY HARDWARE.
IMPACT IF REMAINING DEVICE ALSO FAILS.
MISSION
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY TRANSFER BAG
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
MMU
STRUCTURE AND MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/2R
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF BATTERY IF OPENING SUFFICIENT ENOUGH TO LOSE
ENTIRE BATTERY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY TETHER STRAP
FAILS TO RETAIN BATTERY
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURE AND MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 3/2R
OPS : /NA
POST-OPS : /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : MATERIAL FAILURE, BRACKET FRACTURES, SNAP
FRACTURES/RELEASES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BATTERY LOST TO SPACE.
FUNCTIONAL.
MISSION IMPACT IF OTHER TETHER ALSO NON-
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTINGENCY TOOL
FAILS TO RELEASE FLEX HOSE FROM QD
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) MMU
2 ) FSS
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 2/2
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
CAUSES: BINDING, MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO REMOVE/SEPARATE FLEX HOSE FROM QD.
FSS AND UNAVAILABLE FOR MISSION.
MMU RETAINED IN
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTINGENCY TOOL
FAILS TO RELEASE ARMANGLE MECHANISM
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) FSS
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 3/2R
OPS : /NA
POST-OPS : /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
CAUSES: BINDING, MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO RELEASE ARM WOULD RESULT IN MISSION IMPACT IF POWER
TOOL HAS ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
5/16" THIN WALL SOCKET
FAILS TO INTERFACE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) FSS
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 3/2R
OPS : /NA
POST-OPS : 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE, SOCKET STRIPPED OR BENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO EMPLOY SOCKET ON LAUNCH BOLTS OR ARM CONTINGENCY
BOLTS. IF CONTINGENCY TOOL ALSO FAILED MISSION IMPACT RESULTS
FROM INABILITY TO RELEASE MMU.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-52
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
5/16" THIN WALL SOCKET
FAILS TO INTERFACE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MMU
2) FSS
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS : 3/2R
OPS : /
POST-OPS : 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE, SOCKET STRIPPED OR BENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO EMPLOY SOCKET ON LAUNCH BOLTS OR ARM CONTINGENCY
BOLTS. IF CONTINGENCY TOOL ALSO FAILED MISSION IMPACT RESULTS
FROM INABILITY TO RELEASE MMU.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBWAY STRAPS
SEPARATES FROM DONNING STATION
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2) FSS
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECTS DUE TO STRAPS BEING NON-CRITICAL IN DONNING OR DOFFING
PROCESSES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THRUSTER CUE LIGHT EXTENDER
DOES NOT OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURE AND MECHANISM
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: 3/3
POST-OPS: 3/3
A [ 2 ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
CAUSES: FRACTURED, MATERIAL FAILURE, SEPARATED FROM MMU
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW INCONVENIENCE, OTHERWISE NO MAJOR IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4013
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAMERA BRACKET
FAILS TO INTERFACE
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
B)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURE AND MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: 3/3
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO ATTACH CAMERA. THE CAMERA IS NOT CONSIDERED A
CRITICAL COMPONENT FOR MISSION SUCCESS, LIFE SUPPORT, OR VEHICLE
OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-56
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUNSHIELD
LOSS OF THERMAL PROTECTION
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MMU
STRUCTURES AND MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: /NA
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE COMPONENT IS CONSIDERED IN THE SAME FASHION AS THE ORBITER
SKIN AND THEREFORE NOT CONSIDERED FOR ANALYSIS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM: MMU
MDAC ID: 4015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEATERS
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MMU
2 ) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRE-OPS: /NA
OPS: /NA
POST-OPS: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE CAUSE FOR FAILURE IS NOT CREDIBLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-58
APPENDIX F
NABA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CR088 REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
1 IOA recommends changing the second failure mode
described in the effects field.
2 IOA recommends deleting the IOA failure mode.
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